

MALIK AMBAR,

A BIOGRAPHY BASED ON ORIGINAL SOURCES

BY

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WITH A FOREWORD BY
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AUTHOR'S NOTE.

I am highly indebted to Sir Jadunath Sarkar for the assistance and facilities that he gave me with a generous mind during my researches; his valuable library, in particular, was a great asset to me, but for which it would have been impossible for me to go on with a work like this.

My grateful acknowledgments are also due to Dr. R. C. Mazumder, Ph.D., and Dr. K. R. Qunango, Ph.D., for the assistance they offered me from time to time in course of my study. I may also acknowledge here my gratitude to the Librarian, Imperial Library, for his kindness to allow me to retain a copy of *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* (R. and B.) for a period of about six months.

FOREWORD.

(7472)

Malik Ambar is one of the three true statesmen that Islam in Southern India has produced, and in some respects he is the greatest of them. In constructive genius and the combination of high military capacity with administrative skill, he towers above Khwajah Mahmud Gawan and Sir Salar Jang. Nor did his work die with him : it survived for centuries after in the local revenue system and in the judicious blending of Maratha portisan fighters with regular troops in Deccan warfare. Another stranger in India and an ex-slave, he built up a State out of nothing, in the teeth of the hostility of the highly civilised and long-established Mughal and Bijapuri monarchies. This is a feat unrivalled in Indian history.

How this was done has been unfolded in the present book by a critical and exhaustive use of all the reliable sources, with an economy of words and a rigid avoidance of irrelevancies that deserve as much praise as its range of scholarship. At last the great Abyssinian soldier-statesman has ceased to be the shadow,—with a halo round him, no doubt, but still a name only,—that he had been before this, and we can now see him as he lived and thought in the eyes of his contemporaries.

Having watched over the growth of this work in my library and afterwards co-operated with two other gentlemen in examining it, I can only repeat here that

all three of us,—two of them differing from me in race and country,—were satisfied with the high standard attained by this thesis. It has since then been greatly improved by effecting certain modifications suggested by the examiners and still more by incorporating the story of Malik Ambar as given in Fuzuni Astarabadi's *Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi* (British Museum ms.), no copy of which was available in India when this thesis was first written, but an English translation of which made by me was printed six months afterwards. Thus, it can be safely asserted that no original source on this hero known to exist anywhere has been left unused by our author.

JADUNATH SARKAR.

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INTRODUCTION.

The importance of Malik Ambar in Mediæval Indian History cannot be exaggerated. His advent not only introduced a new era of justice, toleration, and equality in the Deccan, but brought about a new phase in the political and economic conditions of that country. Politically, he revived and re-established a dying kingdom in the face of the stern opposition of the powerful Mughal Empire at the meridian of its glory, formed a coalition of the Deccani powers hitherto rare in the Deccan against the selfish greed of northern aggrandizement, and, finally, left a kingdom with its uncompromising independence intact. Economically, by his wise revenue system he made the country flourishing, prosperous, and happy, with a corresponding increase in the Government revenue. His system which was known as "Malik Ambar's Dhara" became the basis of all future revenue settlements

in the Deccan. His achievements were almost unparalleled in Mediæval Indian History, and specially because of the fact that he gained his success through the good-will and co-operation of the people—extremely scarce in Mediæval India. The history of such a glorious personage is still shrouded in the gloom of mystery, and no historian has, up till now, attempted to make an exhaustive survey of his diverse activities in the light of contemporary and other chronicles. The object of the present volume is thus to supply this gap in Indian historical literature. James Grant Duff and Mountstuart Elphinstone have only given a skeleton of his life. Beniprasad's *Jahangir* is an advance on the earlier English treatment of the subject, but many phases of Ambar's life, such as his early life and adventures, his enthronement of the king, his transfers of capitals, his relations with Murtaza Nizam Shah II, Raju Deccani, Malik Sandal, Manjhan Khan, and other Ahmadnagar nobles, his revenue reforms, and other administrative changes are necessarily untouched in Beniprasad's monograph.

Malik Ambar's relations with Bijapur and the Mughals have also been ignored in many instances.

In this volume, for the first time, all the contemporary Persian chronicles, such as, the Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, Iqbalnama, Tarikh-i-Ferishta, Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Maasir-i-Rahimi, the contemporary travellers and records of English Factories, and other subsequent Sanskrit and Persian chronicles—Shiva Bharat, Khafi Khan, Dilkasha, and other writings—have been carefully sifted and utilized. It has thus been possible to give here an exhaustive and continuous narrative of all the details of Malik Ambar's career, both at home and abroad. His early adventures and difficulties and his relations with the Mughals, the different Deccani powers, the King Murtaza Nizam Shah II, and the nobles of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom have been described at length. The eighth Chapter contains an appreciation of his life's work together with his invaluable contribution to the building up

of the Marhatta nation, and the last Chapter treats of his administrative arrangements, including his famous land revenue system which is undoubtedly his most precious legacy to his adopted country and posterity. Thus in all its aspects, the present volume fills up one of the most important gaps in Indian History and is distinctly a new contribution to Indian Historical literature.

JOGINDRA NATH CHOWDHURI.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

1. The *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* or Memoirs of Jahangir stands undoubtedly as the best authority in regard to Malik Ambar's relations with the Mughal Government.

As between the two versions of these Memoirs—that of Syed Ahmad Khan and the other forming the text of Major David Price's translation—it is now accepted by scholars that the former is the real and authentic Memoirs of the Emperor Jahangir, whereas the latter is a forgery. The first part of Syed Ahmad's printed Persian Text appeared at Ghazipur in 1863 A.D., and the second part at Aligarh in 1864 A.D. It has been translated into English by Mr. Alexander Rogers, and revised and edited by Mr. Henry Beveridge.

After the completion of the Memoirs for the first twelve years of the reign, Jahangir bound them together, had a number of copies made, and distributed them among the high officials—the first copy going to his son Shah Jahan. On reaching the seventeenth year of his reign the Emperor's ill-health prevented him from pursuing the Memoirs any further, and the continuation of the work was then entrusted to Mutamad Khan, the author of *Iqbalnama*, who carried the history down to the beginning of the nineteenth year of the reign. Although Mutamad Khan discontinued the writing

of the Memoirs, he continued the narrative in a brief form in his *Iqbalnama* till Jahangir's death.

In the first quarter of the eighteenth century Muhammad Hadi brought the Memoirs to the close of Jahangir's reign, but his work is little more than a summary of the *Iqbalnama*. Syed Ahmad's Edition contains all portions of *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, including the writings of Muhammad Hadi known as *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*.

From the accession of Jahangir in 1605 A.D., to the death of Malik Ambar in 1626 A.D., all the events in the Deccan—the Mughal victories and defeats, their successes, and discomfitures, and the achievements of Malik Ambar, have been vividly and graphically described in the *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* without exaggeration or over-estimation. Its impartial and unbiassed tribute to the departed hero in the *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* deserves special credit.

2. The *Iqbalnama* of Muhammad Sharif Mutamad Khan (Bakhshi or pay-master in Jahangir's reign) is an important contemporary authority on the subject. His work is divided into three parts—first, the history of the Timurids to the death of Humayun; second, the reign of Akbar; and the third, the reign of Jahangir, and the accession of his son Shah Jahan. The first two parts are rare, but the third part has been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, in the *Bibliotheca Indica Series*; portions of the latter have also

been translated into English in Elliot and Dowson's *History of India*, Vol. VI.

For the first eighteen years of Jahangir's reign *Iqbalnama* is no better than an abridged edition of *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, but for the rest of his reign, which was not dealt with in the Memoirs, it is our best source for the period.

This work is valuable for the detailed narration of the campaigns between Malik Ambar and the Mughals which have been painted in a lucid style without any bias or distortion of facts. The author's glowing tribute to the Abyssinian Chief is of special interest.

3. The *Maasir-i-Rahimi* of Muhammed Abdul Baqi Nihawandi. The author was a retainer of Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khanan and lived with him in the Deccan. This book is specially valuable for its good and detailed account of the campaigns of the Khan-i-Khanan and of his sons against Malik Ambar down to 1025 A.H. (1616 A. D.), and the history of Raju Deccani. The whole of the text has been published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

4. *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab* of Muhammad Hashim Khafi Khan. It was written in the first part of the eighteenth century and its full text is now available in the Bibliotheca Indica Series of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. It gives an account of the Mughal Emperors in detail, but its chief value lies in the history of Aurangzeb

and his successors. In the earlier periods he depended upon the preceding chronicles, and his account of Jahangir's reign is primarily based upon *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, *Iqbalnama*, and other older works. No English translation of the early part of the book is available, but the accounts of Aurangzeb and his successors have appeared in English in Elliot's *History of India*, Vol. VII.

This work is of interest for the detailed descriptions of Malik Ambar's wars with the Mughals, but they have little independent value and may be used as supplementary to the *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* and *Iqbalnama*. The third volume contains a short biographical sketch of Malik Ambar only for a few years, but it commits several errors which I have already pointed out.

5. The *Tarikh* better known as the *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* of Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah, or Ferishta, as he is commonly known, is a good authority for about eight years of Malik Ambar's career commencing from 1600 A.D., and it is highly valuable for Malik Ambar's relations with Raju, Farhad Khan, Malik Sandal, Manjhan Khan, the King Murtaza Nizam Shah II, and the Khan-i-Khanan.

Ferishta was an inhabitant of the Deccan and he wrote his history practically in the first decade of the seventeenth century. His work is unanimously regarded as the best authority on the Deccan affairs and it has

been written in a clear, simple, and straightforward manner. The whole work has been translated into English by Lieutenant Colonel John Briggs of the Indian Army under the title of "History of the Rise of the Muhammadan power in India."

6. The *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk* of Mir Rafiuddin Shirazi. It is a history of Bijapur, and the Bahmanis, the Sultans of Gujrat, Ahmadnagar, and Golconda together with a detailed account of Babar, Humayun, and Akbar, and the Safavi Kings of Persia. It was written (1608 A.D.--1611 A.D.) at Bijapur during the reign of Ibrahim Adil Shah II. The author was a contemporary of Malik Ambar and brought down his account of the Abyssinian hero up to 1609 A.D. It gives a good and lucid account of Malik Ambar's early life, advent, and rise to which no other writer does proper justice. Malik Ambar's matrimonial connection with the King, his relation with Raju, and his early alliance with Bijapur have also been described in it in detail and with precision. The economic condition of the Ahmadnagar State to which it makes casual references is of special value.

Only a portion of this book relating to the Bahmani Empire has been translated into English by Major J. S. King in his "History of the Bahmani Kingdom." The Persian copy of *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk* which I have used (Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms.) is a copy from the Salar Jang Library Ms.

7. The *Busatin-us-Salatin* of Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi.

It is a popular history of the Sultans of Bijapur written in 1824 A. D. It gives short accounts of Malik Ambar's wars with the Mughals, his relations with Bijapur, his wrangling with the King Murtaza Nizam Shah II, and some other matters in a useful and fairly accurate manner.

8. The *Akbarnama* of Shaikh Abul Fazl. Both text and English translation (by Beveridge) have been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in the Bibliotheca Indica Series. This is an important history of the reign of Akbar and its accounts come up to the year 1602 A.D., which witnessed the death of the author. It is useful for the Mughal wars with the Deccanis between 1600 and 1602 A. D.

9. The *Maasir-ul-Umara* (or "Marks of Amirs"). It contains biographical sketches of Mughal amirs from Babar to the eighth decade of the 18th century. The authors are Samsamuddaulah Shah Nawaz Khan and his son Abdul Hai, and the text has been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Up till now a small portion has been translated into English by Mr. H. Beveridge.

Although it is the compilation of a later age, it derived its materials from earlier sources and its narrative generally deserves credence. In the biographical

sketches of Jahangir's peers, the Khan-i-Khanan, and others, it has incidentally given an outline of Mughal wars with Malik Ambar ; but its beautiful appreciation of the Ahmadnagar chief in a nutshell is the most useful thing found in the book.

10. *Shiva Bharat* written in Sanskrit by Kavindra Paramānanda about 1670 A.D. "It is an epic poem on Maloji, Shahji, and Shivaji (ending abruptly with Shiva's conquest of the Ratnagiri district in April 1661, canto 32, V. 9). Narrated in the form of a dialogue between the poet and the Brahmans of Benares, where Paramānanda had come on a pilgrimage (between 1664 and 1673 A.D.)." The book has been "edited with a Marathi translation, copious notes, and portentously long disquisitions (a la Rajwade) in a sumptuous edition by S. M. Diveker (1927)." (Sir J. N. Sarkar's *Shivaji* p. 415.

For our purpose it is interesting for the detailed description of the battle of Bhatvadi that it gives from the Marhatta side.

11. *The Nuskha-i-Dilkasha* of Bhimsen. The author was a civil officer of the Mughal Government in the Deccan during the reign of Aurangzeb and hence he had a good opportunity of acquiring an accurate knowledge of the Mughal affairs of the Deccan. He writes in a simple, concise and straightforward manner and is free from fulsome eulogy or flowers of rhetoric. It is useful for its narrations of some of the circumstances leading

to the battle of Bhatvadi, and impartial appreciation of Malik Ambar. The book is very rare and only three copies of it are known to exist; one in the British Museum (or 23), London; the second, in the India Office Library, London, but it is incomplete and ends abruptly with the capture of Golconda in 1867 A.D. (No. 94 Etche's Catalogue 445); and the third, in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris (Suppl. 259 Blochet's Catalogue 602). I have used Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms., which is a copy of the India Office Ms.

12. The *Tarikh-i-Shivaji* or the History of Shivaji, which is a Persian translation of a Marhatta original, is not of any particular value for the period with which we are dealing, but it is only traditional and cannot be accepted as true or reliable. One copy of the Ms. is in the India Office, London, and some other copies are also to be found in the British Museum and the Royal Asiatic Society's Library. I have used Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms., which is a copy from the Ms. of the Royal Asiatic Society.

13. William Finch, a merchant and contemporary voyager, who had made extensive tours in Northern India, alluded incidentally to some of the Deccan campaigns of the Mughals, which are worthy of notice and consideration. His observations have been published in the fourth volume of *Purchas His Pilgrims*.

14. Sir Thomas Roe, who came to India in the second decade of the 17th century to secure some commercial concessions for the English merchants in the Mughal Empire, collated his observations and gave them to posterity, which are now available both in *Purchas His Pilgrims* (Vol. IV) and Hackluyt Society's publication, the latter being a masterly edition by Sir William Foster. This book is only incidentally necessary for our purpose.

15. The *English Factories in India* edited by Sir William Foster and published under the authority of the Secretary of State for India.

They throw occasional lights on the dislocation of trade due to wars with Malik Ambar and the Mughals.

16. *Bombay District Gazetteers*, particularly the volumes on Ahmadnagar, Poona, Khandesh, and Thana Districts, supply rare and authentic informations about Malik Ambar's revenue administration, based on the East India Company's records and other old papers. They are also valuable for topographical details.

17. *A History of the Marhattas* by James Grant Duff (1826 A.D.). Among the three volumes of the book the first one contains a short sketch of Malik Ambar, including his famous land revenue system, which is both reliable and authoritative. The latter account is primarily based on Marhatta Mss., which are now lost.

18. An Urdu life of Malik Ambar by Shaikh Chand. The writer is a modern graduate, but he gives no new information about Malik Ambar and he had no access to any original paper or Ms. of that great man's time.

19. Elphinstone's *History of India*. It gives a short account of Malik Ambar and his activities, but it is neither comprehensive nor has it utilized the original authorities.

20. *A short History of Muslim Rule in India* by Ishwari Prasad. The author's short notices of Malik Ambar deserve consideration, but they are not exhaustive.

21. Beniprasad's *Jahangir* has dealt with at some length and in a lucid and elegant style the Mughal relations with Malik Ambar, the latter's rupture with Bijapur, and some other connected events of his life, but he has neither made an exhaustive use of all the sources, nor is the work comprehensive of all the different phases of Ambar's activities.

22. *History of Aurangzeb* by Sir J. N. Sarkar, Vol. I gives a short appreciation of Malik Ambar in a simple, elegant and forceful manner, which is particularly laudatory to the Ahmadnagar chief.

23. *Historical Landmarks of the Deccan*, by Major T. W. Haig.

It is invaluable for the interesting and beautiful descriptions of important historical places and forts of the Deccan.

24. Seely's *Wonders of Elora* has been used incidentally for its fine description of the fort of Daulatabad.

25. Murray's *A Hand book for travellers in India, Burma, and Ceylon* is valuable for its topographical descriptions.

26. *Report on the antiquities in the Bidar and Aurangabad districts* by James Burgess.

Its chief value lies in the short history and description of the famous city of Aurangabad.

27. The *Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shāhi* of Fuzuni Astarabadi, the only ms. of which known to exist is Add. 27,251 of the British Museum. The book was written at Bijapur about 1640-43 A.D. It is highly valuable for its reliable account of the early life of Ambar and his relations with Bijapur. About his earlier days Fuzuni repeated most of the information supplied by Mir Rafiuddin, but in some places he has given new and valuable information. About Ambar's latter career he is specially valuable as his point of view is that of a Bijapuri partisan. He committed several mistakes, specially about the Marhatta names and certain events which are better known from the official Mughal accounts.

28. The *Padshahnama* of Abdul Hamid Lahori, written during Shah Jahan's reign, gives a general summary of the Mughal wars with Ambar, but in its accounts of Shah Jahan's campaigns against Ahmadnagar it is more detailed.

29. Selections (in Marathi) from the Peshwa Daftar (No. 31) edited by G. S. Sardesai (1933)—used for the sanads of Ambar mentioned there.

MALIK AMBAR.

CHAPTER I.

Section 1. Physical aspects of the Deccan.

The geographical unity of India has been diversified by the Vindhya and Satpura Ranges, which divide the Gangetic plains of the north from the Deccan tableland. This natural bifurcation of India clearly indicates the nature of the hilly country to be found beyond those ranges in the south in contrast with the vast expanse of alluvial plains of the north. The greater part of the northern Deccan or Maharashtra ("the land of the Marhattas"), as it is called, with which we shall mostly have occasion to deal, may be divided into three parts. On the extreme west the territory lying between the Indian Ocean and the Western Ghats, extending from Bombay to Goa, which is a narrow rugged strip of land, is called the Konkan. This portion receives heavy showers of monsoon and produces rice on the sea coast, while the rest of it is full

of hills and forests. To the east of it the belt of land about twenty miles in breadth, which is also very rugged and "broken by deep winding valleys," is called Maval. Here the nature of the land makes it a happy hunting ground for wild animals. Further to the east the valleys widen until they form plain open country but still broken by low hilly ranges. The soil of this portion is neither very fertile nor does it get good rainfall, as almost the whole fury of the monsoon is spent up in the Ghats, but it produces rice and other cereals to afford a bare subsistence.

The greatest advantage of such a country in those days was its political security from sudden foreign invasion and its capacity for protracted defence which might wear out even a powerful adversary. "The whole of the Ghats and neighbouring mountains often terminate towards the top in a wall of smooth rock, the highest points of which, as well as detached portions on insulated hills, form natural

fortresses, where the only labour required is to get access to the level space, which generally lies on the summit. Various princes, at different times, have profitted by these positions. They have cut flights of steps on winding roads up the rocks, fortified the entrance, with a succession of gateways, and erected towers to command the approaches; and thus studded the whole of the region about the Ghats and their branches with forts.”¹

Section 2. Break-up of the Bahmani Empire and its offshoots.

The middle of the fourteenth century saw the establishment of an independent centre of Muhammadan power and civilization in the south. This was the Bahmani Empire, which flourished with an era of expansion for about a century and four decades, till it dwindled down and finally gave place to five independent principalities set up by different governors of the

1. Elphinstone's History of India p. 615.

Empire. The Imad Shahi dynasty of Berar (1484 A.D.—1574 A.D.) was founded by Fathullah Imad Shah, the Bahmani governor of Berar; the Nizam Shahi kingdom of Ahmadnagar (1490 A.D.—1637 A.D.) by Ahmad Nizam Shah, the governor of Junnar; the Adil Shahi kingdom of Bijapur (1489 A.D.—1686 A.D.) by Yusuf Adil Shah, the governor of Bijapur; the Barid Shahi dynasty of Bidar (1526 A.D.—1619 A.D.)² by Amir Barid, the Bahmani minister; and the Qutb Shahi dynasty of Golconda (1518 A.D.—1686 A.D.) owed its origin to Qutb-ul-Mulk, the governor of Telingana.

The respective positions of these kingdoms were as follows :—

2. Some of the modern writers hold that Bidar was conquered by Bijapur in 1609 A.D.; but this view is erroneous. Bidar helped Malik Ambar in his struggle with the Mughals as late as 1616 A.D. (*Maasir-i-Rahimi* vol. II, p. 526). According to *Busatin-us-Salatin* it fell in 1619 A.D. (*Busatin-us-Salatin* p. 272), which is also recorded by Haig in his "Historical Landmarks of the Deccan" (pp. 18, 101).

Ahmadnagar was situated in the south of the kingdom of Khandesh and in the north of Bijapur; Berar was on the north-eastern side of Ahmadnagar, but it was subsequently annexed by the latter in 1574 A.D.; Bidar was situated on the south-eastern side of Ahmadnagar, and Golconda's western boundary was mostly identical with the eastern frontier of Bidar, but its (Golconda's) northern extension was enclosed between the Godavari, the Pen Ganga, and the Wain Ganga rivers. Of these five principalities the two neighbouring kingdoms of Nizam Shah and Adil Shah played very significant parts in the Deccan politics and moulded the course of events south of the Nerbada for a pretty long period.

Section 3. Origin and rise of the Nizam Shahi kingdom—the appellation Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri.

Ahmad Nizam Shah, the founder of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, was the son of Nizam-ul-Mulk

Bahri, originally a Brahmin of Vijayanagar, whose real name was Timabhat, the son of Bahrlu.³ In his infancy Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri was taken prisoner by the Bahmani sovereign Ahmad Shah (1422—1435 A.D.), converted to Islam, and given the name of Malik Hasan. He was brought up and educated along with Prince Muhammad, and from his father's name he was called *Bahrlu*, but the prince, being unable to pronounce the word Bahrlu, called him *Bahri*, whence he was known as Malik Hasan Bahri. Subsequently, he was put in charge of the royal hawks, and the word for "hawk" being Bahri, it became a part of his title. By dint of his extraordinary abilities he gradually rose to high distinction in the realm, even to the premiership, and obtained the lofty title of Nizam-ul-Mulk.⁴

After the demise of his father, brought about by a conspiracy of his rivals, Malik Ahmad

3. Tarikh-i-Ferishta vol. II, p. 93.

4. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 93.

assumed the appellation of his father Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri, and hence the independent dynasty, which he founded after the defeat of the Bahmani army in 1490 A.D., was known as the "Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri" dynasty. In 1494 A.D., he removed his capital from Junnar to Ahmadnagar, on the river Sena, and beautified it with such fine gardens and magnificent buildings that it was said to have rivalled the famous cities of Cairo and Baghdad. Slowly and steadily, he consolidated his power and laid the foundation of the kingdom on a strong basis, securing in his possession some important and strategic fortresses like Daulatabad, Parenda, and Ausa, besides Junnar and Ahmadnagar.

The interest of the subsequent history of Ahmadnagar mainly centres round the frequent and prolonged wars with its neighbours, specially Bijapur. Husain Nizam Shah, the third king of this dynasty, joined the confederacy of the Muhammadan States against Vijayanagar, the great Hindu power of the south, and took a

prominent part in its destruction in the famous battle popularly known as the battle of Talikota (January 23, 1565 A.D.). The annexation of Berar in 1574 A.D., during the reign of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, the fourth Nizam Shahi sovereign, enhanced the glory, power, and prestige of the kingdom, and it attained its greatest territorial expansion during this reign, thus occupying the foremost place in the Deccan. On the west, it extended to the Indian Ocean from Bassein to Bankot, on the north to the Khandesh frontier, to the north-east it included Berar, which was bounded on the north by the river Tapti and the eastern and southern boundaries of which were enclosed by the Wain Ganga, Warda, and Pain Ganga rivers ; the line, subsequently coming through the Godavari and the north-western boundary of Bidar, moved first in the south-western direction, and passing Ausa⁵ and Sholapur, it took a north-western course, serving as

5. Ausa was included in the Nizam Shahi kingdom whereas Sholapur at this time belonged to Adil Shah.

the northern boundary of Bijapur till it reached Bankot.

Section 4. Party strife and disintegration in the kingdom—first siege of Ahmadnagar by the Mughals.

But internal dissensions and mutual jealousies among the nobles of different races, which had made their appearance even from the infancy of the kingdom, began to sap its foundation, and gradually with the degeneracy of the reigning sovereigns, they reached such an extent that personal interest rather than the welfare of the state became the guiding maxim of every influential and powerful nobleman. They reached their climax on the death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah in 1595 A.D., when four different parties arose to contest the throne.

The first party was organized by Chand Bibi, the aunt of the late king and widow of Ali Adil Shah I of Bijapur, who took up the cause of Ibrahim's son Bahadur, and proclaimed him

king, with herself as Regent. The second party was headed by Ikhlas Khan, who had procured a child called Moti and declared him the legal heir to the Nizam Shahi throne. The third party was led by Ahang Khan, an Abyssinian nobleman, who championed the cause of Shah Ali, the son of Burhan Nizam Shah I (1508 A.D. —1553 A.D.); and the fourth party was commanded by Mian Manjhu, the prime minister of the late king, who had procured a boy named Ahmad, and declared him to be descended from the Nizam Shahi royal family. Mian Manjhu seized the royal treasury, took possession of the capital city, and proclaimed his minion as king. Chand Bibi's nominee Bahadur Nizam Shah was captured and imprisoned.

But soon it came to light that Ahmad's claim was fictitious, whereupon a keen rivalry sprang up between Mian Manjhu and Ikhlas Khan, who had previously supported the former, with the result that Mian Manjhu was finally compelled to take shelter in the walled city of

Ahmadnagar, and apply to Prince Murad, the son of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, who was then in Gujrat, for relief. The Prince who had already received instructions from his father, to embark on a Deccan campaign, was only too glad to receive this invitation and in company with Raja Ali Khan, the ruler of Khandesh, and Abdur Rahim Khan-i-Khanan, one of the best Mughal generals and politicians of the time, marched towards Ahmadnagar (1595 A.D.).

But in the meantime, a rebellion in Ikhlas Khan's camp caused many of his adherents to desert him and swell the forces of Mian Manjhu, who defeated Ikhlas Khan and captured his nominee Moti. Repentant of having called in Mughal assistance Mian Manjhu now joined hands with Chand Bibi, and leaving her as Regent of the kingdom, he went away with his minion Ahmad Shah towards Adil Shah and Qutb Shah to implore their assistance.

With his departure Chand Bibi took up the management of all affairs in her own hands, and

with her usual sagacity, intrepidity, and uncommon abilities, she offered a gallant resistance to Prince Murad, who had besieged the fort and was trying hard to occupy it. At the same time she appealed to Ahang Khan, Qutb Shah, and her nephew, Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur. All of them responded to her call and Adil Shah despatched twenty-five thousand and Qutb Shah five to six thousand cavalry to her assistance.⁶ Ikhlas Khan likewise threw aside his selfish designs, and he and Mian Manjhu in conjunction with the Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi forces advanced to the relief of Ahmadnagar.

Prince Murad made all possible efforts to storm the fort before the arrival of these heavy reinforcements, but they were all nullified by the heroic resistance of Chand Bibi. To make

6. Burhan-i-Maasir says Adil Shah despatched thirty thousand cavalry and Qutb Shah ten thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry to Ahmadnagar (Burhan-i-Maasir, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. Vol. III, p. 1475), but these figures seem to be exaggerated.

matters worse, he was experiencing want of provisions. On the other hand, Chand Bibi too became diffident of her power and was badly suffering from want of provisions. Both parties were eager to come to terms and, at last, a treaty was concluded between them on condition of the cession of Berar by Ahmadnagar' (March, 1596 A.D.).

Section 5. Second Mughal siege of Ahmadnagar and its fall in August 1600 A.D.

Akbar himself marched to the south to carry on a more vigorous campaign.

Ahmadnagar was again besieged, and due to party strife no effective defence on behalf of the Nizam Shahis could be organized this time and, to crown their misery, Chand Bibi, the only prop of the kingdom, was murdered brutally by a faction. Her death was a prelude to the final catastrophe, and, within a few days, the Mughals stormed the fort (19th August, 1600 A.D.). The young king Bahadur Nizam Shah was sent with his family as state prisoners to Gwalior, where he passed the remainder of his life.⁸ "Valuable jewels, embroidered articles, a noble library and many other things, and twentyfive elephants" were among the booty.⁹

8. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, pp. 162—164 ; Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, pp. 482, 484—495, 497—499; Beveridge's Akbarnama Vol. III, pp. 1114, 1128, 1129, 1132, 1142—1144, 1157—1159 ; 1176.

9. Beveridge's Akbarnama Vol. III, p. 1159.

Ahmadnagar was thus annexed to the Mughal Empire and constituted a separate Suba. It lost all its former glory and splendour, and the magnificent city, which had once resounded with the gallant activities of its warriors, and whose grandeur had rivalled that of the famous cities of Cairo and Baghdad, sank into an unimportant and commonplace town.

But although the capital city with its surrounding district came into Mughal possession, the kingdom, as a whole, did not lose its independent existence. The greater part of it remained in the hands of influential Nizam Shahi nobles, like Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani, who wielded uncontrolled power within their jurisdictions; but there was no government, no king, no unity among the different leaders and its fate seemed to be sealed. But it was Malik Ambar who proved to be its saviour at this critical juncture, and he not only lifted it from the deep quagmire into which it had fallen, but restored its past splendour, and rejuvenated it to a new life.

CHAPTER II.

Section I. Birth and early life of Malik Ambar.

Malik Ambar was born of an obscure Abyssinian family. Historians are agreed that he died at the age of eighty in 1626 A.D.¹; this shows that the date of his birth was 1549 A.D., as the Hijera year is lunar.

Originally, he was a slave of Khwajah Baghdad, otherwise known as Mir Qasim. After purchasing him in Baghdad, Mir Qasim sold him at Ahmadnagar to Chengiz Khan, the loyal and devoted minister of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, the fourth sovereign of that dynasty (1565-1588 A.D.). Chengiz Khan had a "thousand purchased slaves" and Ambar was one of them;

1. Iqbalnama places his death at the age of eighty on 31st Urdibihisht, 1035 A.H., which is equivalent to May, 1626 A.D. (Iqbalnama, p. 271). Khafi Khan also says that he died at the age of eighty in 1035 A.H. (Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 376). Shiva Bharat composed by Kabindra Paramānanda in Sanskrit gives this date as 1548 Saka Era which comes to 1626 A.D., (Shiva Bharat-index p. 13) and Busatin-us-Salatin also places it in 1035 A.H. (1626 A.D.) (Busatin-us-Salatin p. 274).

but although he held such an unimportant position there, it was his training ground in regard to political and administrative affairs. A clever and intelligent man as he was he received there an opportunity to get into touch with politics and learn the working of the administrative machinery from the observation of his master's administrative system, which rendered an immense service to him in his later activities. But the sudden demise of his patron² was a severe blow to him.

2. The death of Chengiz Khan was a very pitiable and tragic event in the history of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. After the annexation of Berar to Ahmadnagar in 1574 A.D., he advised Murtaza Nizam Shah I to prosecute his policy of aggrandizement in Bidar but Mirza Khan Ispahani, the Qutb Shahi ambassador, wanted to stop it in the interests of Qutb Shah. For this, he offered a rich bribe to Chengiz Khan, but the latter indignantly refused it, whereupon the ambassador moved to another nobleman, Sahib Khan, who was in high favour with the king, and succeeded in winning him over to his cause. They two formed a conspiracy against the minister and convinced the king that he intended to be independent in Berar. Having thus fallen within their snares the king administered poison to him with the help of his physician, which made an end of him ! It was only too late that the king realized the real situation.

He next served in the army of Nizam Shah for a long time, and during the declining period of this dynasty he sometimes served this man and sometimes that man, and had to be contented with a small salary and ordinary position.

“When the Mughal army became triumphant over the kingdoms of Khandesh, Berar, and Daulatabad, he entered the service of” Bijapur, and held a very undistinguished position there. But an adventurous spirit like him could not be contented with such a poor lot, and he was ever on the alert to enter any new avenue to power and greatness. He left the Adil Shahi kingdom and again came to Ahmadnagar in the company of some other brave Abyssinians.

Confusion and rivalry were still rampant in Ahmadnagar. Here was the beginning of his political activities. When the Abyssinian noble Abhang Khan was opposing Bahadur Nizam Shah, Ambar came to his presence, offered him his services, and exerted himself so well that he rose to the rank of a commander of one hundred

and fifty horsemen. He rendered much valuable assistance to his master in his attack on Ahmadnagar, and after sometime, he commenced acting on his own behalf in that troubled atmosphere. The political unrest and scramble for power then prevailing in the country helped his rise.

When the Khan-i-Khanan was engaged in the siege of Ahmadnagar, Malik Ambar made frequent incursions into the borders of the Nizam Shahi kingdom and punished the local thieves and highwaymen. The latter were so hard-pressed that they elected him as their leader, thus swelling the number of his followers to about 2,500. In proportion to the increase of his men and resources from plunder his enthusiasm and intrepidity increased, while his magnetic personality commanded the implicit faith and obedience of his followers. With a band of active followers continually increasing he proceeded from one daring act to another with the result of increasing his strength still further. He attacked the Barid Shahi army near Bidar, where in the course of an engagement some of the Barid Shahis, deserting the cause of their master, joined him, and he came out victorious over the rest. Laden with booty consisting of some

horses, elephants, and other articles, he turned back from Bidar.

After the capture of Ahmadnagar by the Mughals, they were busy in occupying that kingdom, but Malik Ambar used to obstruct and plunder them whenever he could find an opportunity of doing so, and he came out victorious everywhere till his army grew six to seven thousand strong. Many Nizam Shahi noblemen, also, then joined his standard, which added to his strength, power, and prestige. In this way he gained mastery over the Nizam Shahi politics, and his authority increased as days went on.³

Section 2. Malik Ambar's assumption of power and his early difficulties.

Through his boldness, sagacity, and commanding talents, he pushed on his way with admirable success and soon became an important factor in determining the Nizam Shahi politics. He

3. Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. pp. 571—572; Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi 267a-267b, translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar; Khafi Khan Vol. III, p. 264; Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. III, p. 7; Grant Duff's A History of the Marhattas Vol. I, p. 94.

brought under his possession the Nizam Shahi country from the Telingana borders as far north as within one kros of Bir and four of Ahmadnagar and from twenty kros⁴ west of Daulatabad to within the same distance of the port of Chaul.⁵ With such a big area under him he wielded a correspondingly high influence in the kingdom and became the prime factor in all its activities.

He posed as the champion of the fallen Nizam Shahi dynasty and set to work for its rehabilitation. But there were many obstacles in his way. Internally, the kingdom was in a chaotic and disruptive state, with a complete break-down of the civil administration, and a keen rivalry had been set afoot among its different leaders, each of whom was eager to establish a sovereign

4. One kros is approximately equal to two miles. In Briggs' translation of *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* the distance mentioned is eight kros—*vide* Vol. III, pp. 314—315; I have consulted both the lithographed and manuscript copies of the Persian *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* and in both of them I found twenty kros.

5. *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* Vol. II, p. 165.

state of his own, however small and insignificant it might be. The position of Malik Ambar himself was not free from danger, as he was surrounded on all sides by rivals who looked askance at his rising power and contemplated his downfall. The external condition was not a whit brighter. The Mughals had already occupied a considerable portion of the country and they were on the lookout for occupying the rest, wishing thus to blot out the Nizam Shahi kingdom from the map of India. These were the difficulties which Malik Ambar had to confront, and the restoration of the fallen dynasty would remain a dream unless these could be overcome.

Section 3. Ali, the son of Shah Ali, declared king with the title of Murtaza Shah Nizam-ul-Mulk and order restored in the kingdom.

The exigencies of the moment required a strong nerve and firm determination, and Malik Ambar possessed both these attributes in the right proportion. The two great dangers facing

him—internal dissension and foreign aggression—must be fought out and he exerted every nerve for the salvation of his adopted country. The first thing that he attempted to do was to cure the internal disease, because, he knew that unless this was done none of his work would bear fruit. But here the most vital issue was to fill up the vacant throne by a member of the Royal family, who might be the visible symbol of unity, and to whom the people might look up with reverence. The question now arose—how to find out such a member? The young king Bahadur Nizam Shah, with all the members of his family including the children, was a state-prisoner at Gwalior, and none had been left who might legitimately be raised to the throne. However, Malik Ambar was finally able to find out an heir in Ali, the son of Shah Ali, living at present in Bijapur.

Shah Ali was the son of Burhan Nizam Shah I, the second Nizam Shahi sovereign (1508 A.D.—1553 A. D.), and hence a direct descendant of the

Ahmadnagar Royal family ; his mother Bibi Maryam was the daughter of Yusuf Adil Shah, the first Adil Shahi sovereign (1489 A.D.—1510 A. D.). Burhan Nizam Shah I died, leaving five sons, of whom Husain Nizam Shah succeeded to the throne (1553 A.D.), but a scramble for power arose among the sons and, Shah Ali, being, at last, apprehensive of his life fled to Ibrahim Adil Shah I, the son of Ismail Adil Shah, the then king of Bijapur. Ibrahim Adil Shah I espoused his cause and made a fruitless attempt to put him on the throne. Since then, he was living a retired life in Bijapur, but we have already seen how Abhang Khan had made another fruitless effort on his behalf after the demise of Ibrahim Nizam Shah.

Shah Ali was now an old man of about eighty, and Malik Ambar invited his young son Ali from Bijapur to fill the vacant Nizam Shahi throne. Ibrahim Adil Shah II set him free to accept this invitation, but Ali could not place implicit faith in Ambar's words, and although he went

to Parenda,⁶ he did not assume regal power, and stayed aloof from Ambar's influence for a considerable time, inspite of the latter's repeated requests. At last, after receiving renewed assurances of safety, he came out of the fort (Parenda) and ascended the throne with the title of Murtaza Shah Nizam-ul-Mulk (1600 A.D.). Parenda was fixed as the temporary capital of the kingdom, and Malik Ambar became the Prime Minister and Vakil-us-Sultanat (Regent of the kingdom), and gave his daughter in marriage to the king.⁷

Here Khafi Khan commits two mistakes ; first, he says that Shah Ali, the son of Burhan Nizam Shah I, was raised to the throne with the title of Murtaza Shah Nizam-ul-Mulk ; and,

6. Parenda is situated about seventy-five miles south-east of Ahmadnagar.

7. Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. pp. 576—577 ; Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 164 ; Beveridge's Akbarnama Vol. III, p. 1173 ; Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, p. 511. But Maasir-i-Rahimi makes a mistake in saying that Muhammad Husain, the son of Shah Quli Bahri, was raised to the throne. Fatuhat-i-Adil Shahi 269b, 270a translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar.

secondly, that the temporary capital was fixed at Bidar.⁸ But the contemporary authorities Ferishta and Abul Fazl both assert that the son of Shah Ali and not Shah Ali himself was elevated to the throne. Their statements are corroborated by another contemporary history of great value, namely, *Tazkirat-ul-Mulk*; and besides, although *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* does not mention any particular name, it is apparent from it that a boy king was raised to wield the Nizam Shahi sceptre, which undoubtedly refers to the son of Shah Ali, as the father was a grand old man at that time.⁹ Referring to the second point it is also clear from the *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* and *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk* that the capital was established at Parenda and not at Bidar.

Under the fostering care and efficient management of Malik Ambar law and order were re-established in the kingdom within a short time, and the peasantry carried on their husbandry in peace and tranquillity; the confidence, which the people had lost in the Government was also restored.

8. Khafi Khan Vol. III, p. 264.

9. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 107.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II.

A beautiful story is narrated in Tarikh-i-Shivaji about the advent and rise of Malik Ambar. It is stated there that he came from Bijapur to Daulatabad as a dervish, and while he was sleeping in a shop on the roadside with his legs raised, Sabaji Anant, an influential Nizam Shahi nobleman, happened to pass by that road in a palanquin. His eyes fell upon the soles of the feet of Malik Ambar and he discerned in them the marks of fortune. It was evident to him that this man was "either a chieftain or a chieftain's son. He awakened him," "took him to his house," and, after performing all the formalities, made him the naib of the kingdom with due pomp and grandeur.

But the above narration is no better than a myth. The simple fact that an unknown man without any training in state affairs was, all on a sudden, raised to the position of a naib only

on the ground that there were marks of fortune on the soles of his feet sounds to every reader as a fiction. He must have received proper training in political affairs and acquired sufficient administrative experience before he could aspire to such an eminent position.¹⁰

10. *Tarikh-i-Shivaji* folio 6b (R. A. S. Ms.) translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar in *Modern Review* Vol. 1, January to June, 1907.

CHAPTER III.

Section I. Rivalry between Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani, and consequent attack of the Mughals on the former—1601 A.D.—battle of Nander—1602 A. D.

After the enthronement of the king and the establishment of law and order in the kingdom, Malik Ambar turned his attention to the removal of party spirit among the leaders and to binding the country together in a common cause. Among the most powerful and influential parties which existed in the Nizam Shahi kingdom one was led by Malik Ambar himself and the other by Raju Deccani, another influential Nizam Shahi nobleman, who wielded great authority in the country and who had won over many influential amirs to his side. With the rise of these two parties the smaller parties sank into insignificance, and their leaders arrayed themselves on one or other of these two sides.

Like Malik Ambar, Raju had made his fortune from a small beginning. His real name was

Raja Polad, but he was commonly known as Raja. The Mughal soldiers used to call him Raju instead of Raja, whence he came to be popularly known as Raju. Originally, he was the adopted son of Manna Daccani, the Mahaldar (harem superintendent) of Sadat Khan,¹ a powerful Nizam Shahi chief and great jagirdar. In course of time Raju himself became the Mahaldar of Sadat Khan like his father, and by dint of his prudence and ability, he gradually raised himself to the Madar-ul-Maham (centre of all affairs) to that nobleman.

During the siege of Ahmadnagar by the Mughals Sadat Khan made up his mind to visit

1. Sadat Khan was originally a Hindu slave of Burhan-ul-Mulk, the brother of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, the fourth Nizam Shahi King (Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, p. 501). During the adverse period of that dynasty he wandered through the hills and places difficult of access, and brought under his control some forts. Whenever opportunity afforded him, he used to harass the Mughals on their way and carried off booty from them. (Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. p. 578 ; Fatuhat-i-Adil Shahi 268a, translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar.

the Khan-i-Khanan and enter the Mughal service. 'As Raju was trusted by him, he entrusted all to him and went to interview Khan-i-Khanan. But during the interval, Abhang Khan Habshi enticed Raju with an offer of peerage and wrote to him, "Fortune has made you a great man. Bring the country into your own possession, and become great. Sadat Khan was [only] a slave of Nizam Shah. As he has turned traitor to Nizam Shah and gone over to the Mughals, do you act with bravery, because the reward of fidelity to salt is greatness. Guard carefully the territory and forts now in your hands, and try to increase them."²

Raju acted as advised by Abhang Khan and firmly seated himself on the jagir of Sadat Khan. Although the latter made an attempt, with the help of the Mughals, to drive him out of his country, it was of no avail, and Raju became an independent jagirdar like Malik Ambar.³

He went on adding fresh acquisitions to his

2. *Fatuh-at-i-Adil Shahi* 268a, translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar.

3. *Maasir-i-Rahimi* Vol. II, pp. 501—503; *Tazki-rat-ul-Muluk*, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. p. 573; *Fatuh-at-i-Adil Shahi* 268a, translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar.

jagir, till he subjugated the whole country including Daulatabad⁴ from as far north as the Gujrat frontier to within six kros of Ahmadnagar in the south,⁵ and exercised an influence in the Nizam Shahi kingdom next to that of Malik Ambar, with whom he was sometimes in unison and, at others, in opposition.

Both of them had acted in concord and harmony when they invited Murtaza Nizam Shah II to the vacant throne; both of them professed allegiance to the new king and agreed together to give up the fort of Ausa⁶ for his residence and the revenues of some of the surrounding villages for his maintenance.⁷ Both of them bore a common enmity with the Mughals whom they used

4. Daulatabad is situated about nine miles north-west of Aurangabad.

5. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165; Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. III, p. 7.

6. Ausa is situated about 130 miles south-east of Ahmadnagar.

7. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165; Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. III, p. 7.

to harass and plunder from two different directions. So far there was agreement between them; but as self-interest played a dominant part and the interest of one ran counter to that of the other, no real friendship or lasting unity could be established between them.

Malik Ambar's ascendancy was an eyesore to Raju, and the latter rallied round himself a strong party of opposition against the Abyssinian chief. He hampered Malik Ambar's actions, retarded his progress, and wistfully looked forward to his downfall. The veteran Mughal general Khan-i-Khanan, hearing of their mutual antipathy and ill-feeling, thought it a convenient hour to advance the Mughal frontier, and vigorous attempts were made to annex Malik Ambar's territory on the Telingana border. A strong party under the leadership of S. Abdur Rahman, the son of Abul Fazl, was despatched from Berar, and it proceeded towards Nander.

Getting scent of the Mughal advance, Malik Ambar also proceeded to oppose the enemy.

Near Nander he crossed the Godavari and marched on till he arrived near the river Manjara where he encamped. Both the armies now met together and marshalled their forces in battle array. Malik Ambar led his own centre, his right wing was commanded by Farhad Khan, and his left wing by Mansur Khan. The Mughals also posted worthy commanders to every wing, the centre remaining in charge of S. Abdur Rahman.

On 16th May, 1601 A.D., the fight commenced after mid-day, and after a hard contest the Mughals came out successful. Malik Ambar lost four hundred men killed besides many were wounded.

But this defeat roused the Nizam Shahi chief to further exertion, and he again advanced to the conquered area with a detachment of seven to eight thousand cavalry, took the Mughal officers by surprise, gave them a signal defeat, and recovered the lost places.⁸

8. *Tarikh-i-Ferishta* Vol. II, p. 165 ; Beveridge's *Akbarnama* Vol. III, pp. 1185—1186, 1193—1194.

The discomfiture filled the Khan-i-Khanan with shame and anger, and he despatched a select body of five thousand cavalry under the leadership of his able son Mirza Irij (afterwards distinguished as Shah Nawaz Khan) to retrieve the loss.

But as soon as Malik Ambar got information of the approach of the Mughal lieutenant, he marched to oppose him. He went first to Dam-tour, thence to Qandahar, and then towards Nander, about two hundred miles east of Ahmadnagar, where a severe action took place between the two. The battle commenced with the attack of Malik Ambar's van, first on the enemy's elephants and then on their van. The battle raged on with full fury, but the Mughal general proved his high military genius on the occasion, and completely routed his rival. Malik Ambar himself was wounded and would have fallen into his enemy's hands but for the gallantry of some of his attendants who carried him away from the field to safety (1602 A.D.).⁹

This heavy disaster was a severe shock to Malik Ambar, and it now became evident to

9. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165; Beveridge's Akbarnama Vol. III, p. 1212; Khafi Khan Vol. III, p. 265; Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. III, pp. 7—8.

him that it was but the direct outcome of his rivalry with Raju. They had sown the seed, but the Khan-i-Khanan reaped the fruit. The Mughal general was thus successful in wresting a portion of Malik Ambar's territory and annexing it to the Mughal Empire. (This sudden invasion was too much for Malik Ambar to meet. Neither had the country yet recouped itself from the ravages which it had sustained at the time of the fall of Ahmadnagar, nor was Malik Ambar himself fully prepared to repel such an attack, as he was still much occupied with organizing the internal affairs of the country.) Even the bitter experiences and reverses which the Nizam Shahis had suffered in the past, due to their division and discord, could not teach them wisdom, and the repetition of those antagonisms and dissensions again hastened such a crisis. {Had Raju joined hands with Malik Ambar to work in concord and harmony, it would not only have strengthened the kingdom, but in all probability, the Khan-i-Khanan might not have ventured to attack Malik Ambar at this stage.} The country

would thereby have got a greater opportunity to recoup its losses and then to oppose the Mughal inroad successfully with its full power, restored and rejuvenated.

Section 2. A treaty was concluded between Malik Ambar and the Khan-i-Khanan.

The last disaster made Malik Ambar apprehensive, and he was anxious to retrieve the loss. After recovering from his wound he began to make fresh preparations of war and organized his forces on a stronger basis.

The renewed activities of this gallant leader alarmed the Khan-i-Khanan, mainly for two reasons ; first, he was well aware of Malik Ambar's strength, popularity, and enterprising character and feared lest the Mughals should be overpowered by numbers under so active a leader. Secondly, he was not secure in his own camp, and there were discords and disagreements between him and some of his colleagues, which only made his position weaker. In such adverse circumstances the Mughal general decided to

be on friendly terms with Malik Ambar now and bide his time. He therefore made proposals for peace to him.

On the other hand, Malik Ambar was fully conscious of the enmity of Raju and other noblemen like Patang Rao, Malik Sandal, and Farhad Khan, who had recently deserted him and had been conspiring against him. He required cessation of war to deal with these internal enemies, before launching upon any external warfare and, consequently, when the Khan-i-Khanan sent proposals for peace, he heartily accepted them. He met the Khan-i-Khanan, and a treaty was concluded between him and the Mughal lieutenant marking out their respective boundaries.¹⁰

But this treaty was no more than a truce for a temporary cessation of war. On the one hand,

10. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165 ; Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. p. 574 ; Fatuhat-i-Adil Shahi 268a, but its statement that Ambar met the Emperor Akbar seems to be a myth and it is not mentioned by any historian of that Emperor.

the rising power of Malik Ambar, his organization of a strong army, his enthronement of a Nizam Shahi prince, and his aspirations, and other designs were threats to Mughal safety in the Deccan; on the other hand, the realization of Malik Ambar's ambition, viz., the re-establishment of a stable Nizam Shahi Government would disappear like a bubble if Mughal aggression could not be rendered impossible. Thus, on both sides, permanent or long-standing peace was against the self-interest of the parties.

Section 3. Rebellion of Patang Rao, Farhad Khan, Malik Sandal, and Manjhan Khan¹¹ subdued.

After the treaty Malik Ambar was free to concentrate his attention on crushing his rivals in the state. The conspirators, Patang Rao, Farhad Khan, Malik Sandal, and others, had joined the king Murtaza Nizam Shah II at Ausa and roused him to take up arms against Malik Ambar. Led by their persuasion the king determined to oust him from the Regency and despatched an army against him.¹²

11. In Briggs' translation of Ferishta it is Mittan Khan, Vol. III, pp. 316—317.

12. Khafi Khan Vol. III, p. 265; Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165.

But Malik Ambar advanced post-haste to Ausa. There he met the conspirators, gave them a crushing defeat, and made Patang Rao a prisoner, whereupon the king, on the advice of Farhad Khan and Malik Sandal, was compelled to conclude a treaty with him.¹³

Malik Ambar was, however, glad to win over the king again to his side, and he proceeded with him to Parenda, but its governor Manjhan Khan held out against him on the plea of his (Ambar's) friendship with the Mughals, but being really intent upon supporting the above conspirators in the attempt to bring about the downfall of the Protector. Ambar tried to conciliate him by arguments, pointing out to him that he had been forced to accept Mughal friendship on account of the late conspiracy of Patang Rao, and others, but, at heart, he was a loyal and devoted servant of Nizam Shah, whom he was ready to support till the last breath of his life. But Manjhan Khan remained inexorable and turned a deaf ear to his arguments. Malik Ambar now feared lest the boy king should be

13. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165.

again won over by his enemy as on previous occasions, and, hence, to prevent such a junction, he restrained his movements. It was a necessity at the moment, as the king had not yet attained maturity of understanding and fell an easy prey to the seduction of his enemies, who were eager to enlist his sympathy in order to secure legal sanction to their resistance. Malik Ambar's motive in thus restraining the king was no more than to check any further development of the conspiracy and to avoid the repetition of the late crisis.

When Farhad Khan and Malik Sandal heard of the king's confinement, they hastened to Parenda to support the garrison. Malik Ambar now laid siege to the fort itself ; but for about a month it repelled all his attacks till an untoward event happened which accelerated its surrender. Sona Khan, the son of Manjhan Khan, having kidnapped the wives and daughters of some inmates of the fort, the garrison rose up against him and put him to death. Afraid of his own safety

Manjhan Khan fled from the fort accompanied by Farhad Khan and Malik Sandal, and being opposed both from inside and outside they had no other alternative than to leave the Nizam Shahi kingdom altogether and take shelter in Bijapur where they ultimately entered the service of Adil Shah ¹⁴.

✓ Thus Malik Ambar got rid of some of his bitter enemies—enemies not only of himself but also of the kingdom. Their present exit was a blessing to the country as well as to Malik Ambar.

Sometime after their departure the fort was surrendered to Malik Ambar, who having removed all shackles from the king, introduced him into it with due pomp and grandeur, while he himself went outside with his army. ¹⁵

Section 4. Murtaza Nizam Shah II and Raju conspired against Malik Ambar but their attempt was frustrated.

✓ When Malik Ambar was away from the fort, Murtaza Nizam Shah II opened negotiations with

14. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165.

15. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 165.

Raju, complaining to him of the treatment he had recently received from Malik Ambar. Raju, who had been watching for an opportunity to crush his rival, was only too glad to receive this invitation from the king whom he met at Parenda, and held out to him hopes of reducing his rival.

On hearing of this, Malik Ambar marched towards Parenda and met his opponent near the fort. For sometime no great engagement took place between them, but there were only several skirmishes which were generally decided in favour of Raju. His enemy's strength alarmed Malik Ambar, and as he had been on friendly terms with the Khan-i-Khanan on the basis of his last treaty he thought it prudent to reduce his powerful adversary with Mughal assistance. Messengers were accordingly sent to the Khan-i-Khanan in his camp at Jalna¹⁶ imploring his assistance. That veteran general, who was at present well disposed towards Malik Ambar

16. Jalna is about thirty-five miles east of Aurangabad.

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and disliked Raju for his refractory conduct to Prince Danyal when he had been proceeding from Burhanpur through Raju's territory for his marriage with Ibrahim Adil Shah II's daughter, readily complied with the request of Malik Ambar. Two to three thousand cavalry were despatched under the leadership of Mirza Husain Ali Beg; and Malik Ambar thus reinforced, took courage to make a dash upon Raju. In the battle which ensued Malik Ambar came out successful and Raju, being defeated, fled to Daulatabad.¹⁷

Section 5. Malik Ambar's attempt to subdue Raju, the latter was saved through the intervention of the Khan-i-Khanan.

In April 1604 A.D., Prince Danyal died of intemperance and the Khan-i-Khanan went from his cantonment at Jalna to Burhanpur to succeed the Prince as Viceroy of the Deccan.

17. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, pp. 165—166.

18. Burhanpur, the capital of the Mughal Deccan, was situated in the province of Khandesh on the Tapti, 21° 18' 35" N. long, 76° 16' 26 E.

This death of the Prince and the consequent absence of the Mughal general from Jalna afforded Malik Ambar an opportunity of aggrandizement.

He proceeded against Raju at Daulatabad and again defeated him. Raju's position was now rendered so precarious that he was unable to oppose Malik Ambar any further, and driven to desperation he applied to the Khan-i-Khanan at Burhanpur for assistance. Responding to his call the Khan-i-Khanan personally proceeded to Daulatabad, but after his arrival there, to the surprise of both Malik Ambar and Raju, he acted as an impartial umpire without lending his support to any party and prevented both Malik Ambar and Raju from attacking each other. This state of affairs continued for six months, after which, according to the request of the Khan-i-Khanan, Malik Ambar concluded a treaty with his opponent and retired to Parenda. The Khan-i-Khanan then retired to his camp at Jalna.¹⁹

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This action of the Mughal general was amazing both to Malik Ambar and Raju. But what was the motive behind it? It was true that he was bound by treaty to Malik Ambar, but, if he really meant to keep the spirit of the truce why did he respond to Raju's call and go to Daulatabad? He had, of course, some ulterior motive which prompted him to have recourse to this policy. First, he was thoroughly acquainted with the nature and power of Malik Ambar and he did not like to incur his hostility for the sake of Raju by breaking the peace terms. Secondly, it was not safe in the interests of the Mughals to allow Malik Ambar to gain unrivalled mastery in the Nizam Shahi kingdom, and his real intention was to maintain the balance of power between the two chiefs. Their rivalry was a source of strength and advantage to him, the benefit of which he wanted to enjoy in full.

On the other hand, Malik Ambar did not like to incur the displeasure of the Khan-i-Khanan and allow him an opportunity of siding

with his opponent. So, he chose to abide by his decision and wait for another suitable moment to strike a final blow at Raju.

Section 6. Transfer of the capital from Parenda to Junnar (1607 A.D.) ; Raju was finally subdued.

In 1607 A.D. Malik Ambar transferred the capital of the Nizam Shahi kingdom from Parenda to Junnar (north of Poona), which was its ancient capital and which, on account of its strategic position and comparative proximity to Daulatabad, gave him greater facility to carry on his campaign against Raju.²⁰

After the transfer of the capital Malik Ambar exerted every nerve to subdue his rival and, fortunately, a favourable incident accelerated his success. Raju's administration was odious to his subjects and soldiers alike, and it alienated their sympathy from him. The latter (soldiers) deserted him, went to Malik Ambar, and complained

20. Busatin-us-Salatin p. 270 ; Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 166.

to the Nizam Shah about his oppression. Finding it a suitable opportunity to annex his territory, Malik Ambar received the deserters cordially, gave them robes of honour according to their respective ranks and position ; and being thus strengthened he marched against Daulatabad with a grand army. Raju offered a gallant resistance, but as there were discord and lack of support among his subordinates he could not save himself long, and the fort was soon occupied by Malik Ambar (1607 A.D.). Raju was arrested and imprisoned, and his territory was incorporated in the Nizam Shahi kingdom.²¹

For three to four years he remained a prisoner in Junnar and its vicinity, but as a conspiracy was being organized to bring him out of the

21. Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. pp. 576—578. It says that Raju's officers were corrupted with money. As they were disgusted with his oppression and mal-administration it was natural that they would try to get rid of his clutches and in doing so they made some profit out of it.

Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, p. 511 ; Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 166.

prison and create disturbance, Malik Ambar made an end of him to stop future troubles.²²

Thus was removed the most stubborn and powerful internal opponent of Malik Ambar. A big territory with an important and strategic fortress like Daulatabad passed under his control, and the unity of the kingdom was thus achieved. He now felt himself more secure and was in a position to divert the united energy of the whole Nizam Shahi kingdom to fight out its external enemy, namely, the Mughals, against whom he had already commenced his campaigns.

Section 7. Wrangling between Murtaza Nizam Shah II and Malik Ambar.

Murtaza Nizam Shah II's constant vacillation and support of Malik Ambar's enemies was not only a menace to the Regent himself but was a stumbling-block to the safety and recuperation of the dilapidated state. His complicity in the rebellions of Patang Rao, Farhad Khan, Malik

Sandal, and latterly of Raju, far from benefitting the country had only created a most harmful split in it. So, Malik Ambar considered it wise to depose him and raise another person to the Nizam Shahi throne. He consulted Ibrahim Adil Shah II, but as the latter did not approve of his plan, the idea was subsequently given up (1607 A.D.).²³

With Adil Shah's assistance, however, good-feeling and mutual understanding were re-established between Murtaza Nizam Shah II and Malik Ambar, and there was no repetition of trouble between them for sometime.

But in 1610 A.D., (1019 A.H.)²⁴ misunderstanding again cropped up between the king and Malik Ambar which now assumed serious proportions. When the matter reached the ears of Ibrahim Adil Shah II, he posed as a mediator

23. Busatin-us-Salatin p. 270 ; Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 166.

24. In the lithographed text of Busatin-us-Salatin the date is 1090 A.H., which is a printing mistake. It should be 1019 A.H. (Busatin-us-Salatin p. 270).

as before and, by rebuke and advice, finally settled their differences.²⁵ After this there was smooth sailing for both of them.²⁶

25. Busatin-us-Salatin pp. 270—271.

26. Maasir-i-Rahimi says that some were of opinion that when there were differences between the king and Malik Ambar, the latter managed tō administer poison to the former and thus got rid of him. But the author is doubtful about it and remarks "God only knows". (Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, p. 516). No other historian ever hinted like this, and it was no more than an invented bazar gossip.

CHAPTER IV.

Section 1. Malik Ambar recovered the lost territory of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom—the Khan-i-Khanan was reinforced.

After the death of the Emperor Akbar in October 1605 A.D., his son Prince Salim ascended the throne at Agra with the lofty title of Nuruddin Muhammad Jahangir Badshah Ghazi. The rebellion of Prince Khusru (April 1606 A.D.) following the accession of Jahangir and the siege of Qandahar (1606-1607 A.D.) by the Persian king Shah Abbas Safavi concentrated the attention of the Mughal government in the north-west with a consequent lull in the administration of the south. Finding it a suitable opportunity to avenge the loss of Ahmadnagar, Malik Ambar launched upon an offensive war against the Mughals. He moved in rapid succession from one place to another conquering all the places through which his victorious army passed, and

within a short time, he brought into his possession many of the territories which had been occupied by the Mughals. The Khan-i-Khanan was reduced to a sorry plight, and he proved his inability to stem the onrush of the Abyssinian chief.

In 1608 A.D., he went to Agra according to the order of the new Emperor, when he represented there that if in addition to the force already assigned to the Deccan twelve thousand cavalry with ten lakhs of rupees were given to him, he would suppress all disturbances in the Ahmadnagar territory in the course of two years. Agreeing to his request, the Emperor sanctioned whatever force and money he wanted, and with these reinforcements the Khan-i-Khanan again started for the Deccan.¹

✓ Section 2. Alliance of Malik Ambar with Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur.

Malik Ambar's perplexity grew in intensity

1. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, Rogers and Beveridge, Vol. I, pp. 149, 153 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 71, 73 ; Iqbalnama pp. 34—35 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 259.

when he heard that the Khan-i-Khanan was coming to the Deccan with heavy reinforcements. He had recently commenced in right earnest the recovery of the lost territories of the Nizam Shahi kingdom ; and only a part of the work had been accomplished. If he was over-powered by the Khan-i-Khanan at this early stage, it would not only entail a loss of his new conquests, but as he had broken his pledges to the Mughal general, the matter might be pushed further, reducing him to extremities. Thus apprehensive of his safety, he sought the assistance of Ibrahim Adil Shah II, who had, on several occasions, helped the Nizam Shahi kingdom in the days of its adversity.

His requests were three-fold ; first, to render him military assistance against the Mughals, so that he might fight them successfully, as he had himself said, "It is my design to fight the Mughal troops so long as life remains in this body. It may be that through your Majesty's daily

increasing fortune I shall expel the Mughals from the Deccan." Secondly, to hand over to him, for the safety of his family and the collection of rations, the fort of Qandahar, which Adil Shah had wrested from the Nizam Shahi kingdom sometime back,² and thirdly, to bring the two states together into a close bond of union by matrimony.

His cleverness and manifest command of the situation won him his desired objects. Moreover, there was another diplomatic reason why Adil Shah so readily complied with the request of Ambar, and this was his rooted apprehension of the Mughal policy of annexation in the southern territories. Adil Shah had welcomed the re-establishment of the old Nizam Shahi dynasty and, at heart, he desired the formation of a coalition with Malik Ambar against the Mughals.

He sent ten thousand select horsemen to

2. The fort of Qandahar was occupied by Ibrahim Adil Shah II during the revolutionary period of the Ahmadnagar kingdom. It is situated sixty miles north of Bidar, and thirty-five miles north of Udgir.

Ambar's assistance. The fort of Qandahar was also given up to him, and a matrimonial alliance was contracted between the two states by the marriage of Malik Ambar's son Aziz-ul-Mulk (better known as Fateh Khan) at Bijapur with the daughter of an influential Bijapur nobleman Yaqut Khan, who enjoyed "the highest confidence of the king." A feeling of warmth and cordiality prevailed throughout the ceremony. Arrangements were made for every kind of entertainment, and the celebrations lasted for forty days. Adil Shah took a lively interest in the matter, gave the dowry of the bride out of his treasury, and spent twenty thousand huns, which were equivalent to about eighty thousand rupees, on fireworks alone. On 5th February, 1609 A.D., Fateh Khan left Bijapur for Junnar with his newly married bride.³

The keen interest which Adil Shah took in

3. Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. pp. 578—581; Fatuhat-i-Adil Shahi 271a, 271b, translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar; Busatin-us-Salatin pp. 263—265.

Malik Ambar at that time could be inferred clearly from the part he played in the marriage of Fateh Khan. It was undoubtedly a wise policy of Malik Ambar to knit the two states together so closely, as it not only strengthened the Nizam Shahi kingdom against foreign domination but also augmented his own power and prestige. Subsequently, at his request another select force of three to four thousand cavalry was sent by Ibrahim Adil Shah II to his aid.⁴

Section 3. Prince Parvez sent to the Deccan (1609 A.D.)—defeat of the Khan-i-Khanan (1610 A.D.)—his recall—Malik Ambar reconquered Ahmadnagar—Khan-i-Jahan in command.

Taking advantage of the Khan-i-Khanan's absence Malik Ambar had sent a force towards the fort of Antur, which was in the hands of the

4. Busatin-us-Salatin p. 267.

Mughals, and which he occupied, putting all its garrison to the sword.⁴⁽²⁾

After the return of the Khan-i-Khanan to the Deccan with reinforcements he tried to improve the Mughal position there, but his own house troubled him and he found it difficult to control his subordinates. Ill-feeling, discord, and disagreement were so rampant among them that any concerted and harmonious action was out of the question. The recent victories of Malik Ambar had caused grave anxiety in the mind of the Emperor, and as matters had not improved even after the return of the Khan-i-Khanan with reinforcements, he thought it advisable to send one of the Princes there. Consequently, in 1609 A.D., Prince Parvez was posted to the Deccan with Asaf Khan as his guardian and in company with Sharif Khan, the Amir-ul-Umara. The supreme command was now

4(2) Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. p. 579 ; Fatuhat-i-Adil Shahi 271a, translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar ; Busatin-us-Salatin p. 261.

vested in the Prince, and he was appointed Governor of Berar and Khandesh.⁵

Early in 1610 A.D., this party arrived at Burhanpur with a reinforcement of 1,000 Ahadis and other forces. But before their arrival at Burhanpur the Khan-i-Khanan had applied for further assistance and Asaf Khan even suggested the Emperor's personal presence there. Jāhan-gir thought over the latter proposal and consulted his noblemen about it. But one of them named Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, deprecating this plan, volunteered his own services instead, and represented that as so many amirs had already been despatched there, it was not necessary for the Emperor to go there personally. This idea being approved of by all others, Khan-i-Jahan Lodi was despatched to the Deccan and sufficient reinforcements under the commands of efficient lieutenants like Raja Bir Singh Deo, Raja

5. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 155—157; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 74—75; Iqbal-nama pp. 36—37; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 260.

Bikramjit, Shujaat Khan, and Saif Khan Barha were ordered to accompany him.⁶

But the Mughal position there was going from bad to worse, and they had suffered many severe reverses in the meantime. The Khan-i-Khanan had devised an extensive plan for a surprise attack upon Malik Ambar. So far as the plan was concerned it was an excellent one. Had it been carried out smoothly, it would have brought the Abyssinian hero down to his knees, but as it was not so, it ended in a serious disaster. At the very outset of the campaign the Khan-i-Khanan committed two great errors; first, he moved out in the rainy season, which was quite unsuitable for military operations, and, secondly, he did not take sufficient provisions with him to meet the demands of the army. Turning a deaf ear to the counsels of his wiser officers, he made a dash into the Nizam Shahi territory in such an unfavourable season and with inadequate food supply.

6. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 161-163; Syed's Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 77-78; Iqbalnama pp. 38-39.

On the other hand, Malik Ambar, who had been watching the movements of his opponents and who knew what a formidable army had been mustered against him, avoided open engagements and sought to harass the enemy on their march by cutting off their supplies, skirmishing with them, and plundering them. This predatory or guerilla mode of warfare was very suitable to the physical condition of the country, and it was this Abyssinian master-mind who, having first realized its great importance, recruited and trained a large number of light Marhatta horsemen, who were well-known for their rapidity of movement and easy climbing of hills, and pitted them against the Mughals. These Marhatta cavalry, combined with his other forces trained up in these new tactics and the auxiliaries sent by Adil Shah, so much harassed the Khan-i-Khanan and his army that their position was rendered wholly untenable. They were lured into wrong paths among the rugged hills and difficult passes of Balaghat⁷ (the Uplands) and

7. The uplands of southern Berar, which was full of hills and forests.

continually plundered and harassed on their march. To make their condition still more miserable, the grain was exhausted and it was extremely difficult to obtain it even at an exorbitant price. The sufferings of the army knew no bound, and many men and animals succumbed to starvation. Everything was topsy-turvy and the Mughal officers strongly condemned the Khan-i-Khanan, accusing him of rashness, treachery, and inefficiency. There had already been a difference of opinion between him and his subordinates at the time of the initiation of the campaign, and they had not been duly supporting him in his actions. Now, when the situation turned so disappointing and disastrous, their accusations against him reached their climax. Driven to despair on all sides, the Khan-i-Khanan was compelled to patch up a disgraceful treaty with Malik Ambar and retire to Burhanpur (1610 A.D.).⁸

8. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 178, 179, 183 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 85, 86, 88 ; Iqbal-nama pp. 44—45 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 261—262 ; Beveridge's-Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. I, p. 57 ; William Finch in Purchas His Pilgrims Vol. IV, p. 39.

After the subjugation of the environs of Ahmadnagar fort, Malik Ambar's army had laid siege to that fort itself. Its Mughal commander Khwaja Beg Mirza Safavi, a relation of Shah Tahmasp of Persia, who had been in charge of it since its conquest by Akbar, made every endeavour to defend it, but he had to call for relief from the Khan-i-Khanan. The news of that general's defeat and retreat caused a consternation among the garrison, who wanted to evacuate the fort at once, and although Khwaja Beg Safavi tried his best to pacify and encourage them, it was of no avail. At last, he was compelled to evacuate it on terms of safe passage to Burhanpur.⁹

These reverses were primarily attributed to want of harmony and concert among the Mughal nobles in the Deccan and to rashness and lack of proper management on the part of the Khan-i-Khanan. A strong party of opposition was

9. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 181—182; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 87; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 262; Busatin-us-Salatin p. 270; Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, pp. 514, 516, 518.

arrayed against the latter in his camp and many representations went against him to the Emperor. Khan-i-Jahan also joined in these accusations and suggested that if he were given the supreme command in the place of the Khan-i-Khanan with thirty thousand cavalry as reinforcements, he would, in the course of two years, complete the conquest of Ahmadnagar as well as of Bijapur. If he could not finish this work within the specified time, he would never show his face again in the Court.¹⁰

As the relations between the Khan-i-Khanan and other Mughal amirs in the Deccan had been strained and as an outcome of their mutual antipathy and lack of support, the Mughal interests in the Deccan had been suffering, the Emperor did not think it advisable to retain him there any longer, and he was, therefore, recalled, Khan-i-Jahan being appointed to take up the command.¹¹

10. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, p. 179; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 86; Iqbalnama p. 45; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 262.

11. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, p. 180; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 86; Iqbalnama p. 45; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 262.

A nobleman named Khan-i-Azam was also sent there with a fresh army of 2,000 Ahadis and 10,000 cavalry including experienced and intrepid mansabdars like Khan-i-Alam, Faridun Khan Barlas, Ali Khan, Yusuf Khan, and Baz Bahadur for the assistance of Khan-i-Jahan Lodi.¹²

Section 4. Malik Ambar's transfer of capital from Junnar to Daulatabad. (1610 A.D.).

Malik Ambar had performed great feats and he was now not only master of the whole Ahmad-nagar territory from the Indian Ocean on the west (Bankot to Bassein) to the Bijapur frontier on the south, Bidar on the south-east, and Khandesh on the north, but also of southern Berar or Balaghat. These glorious military campaigns thus not only restored the fallen prestige of the

12. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 183—184 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 88—89 ; Iqbalnama p. 46 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 262.

Khafi Khan says that in all thirty thousand cavalry were sent with Khan-i-Azam, Khan-i-Alam, and Faridun Khan.

Ahmadnagar kingdom, but enhanced the power and popularity of Malik Ambar, who was no longer to be counted as an ordinary rebel but a great leader of an independent country with a welltrained and well-organized force behind him.

In this year (1610 A.D.)¹³ he transferred his capital from Junnar to a more strategically important place Daulatabad,¹⁴ whose isolated position and natural hilly protection were good defence against sudden foreign aggression.

13. In the lithographed text of *Busatin-us-Salatin* p. 270 the date is 1090 A.H., which is a printing mistake.. It should be 1019 A.H. (1610 A.D.).

14. "Its insulated position and its scarp'd sides offer as singular a specimen of human ingenuity and labour as I ever met with..... It is defended by four walls within each other and has a ditch..... These walls in themselves are a good defence against native troops in approaching the citadel..... Daulatabad has always been thought..... impregnable." (Seely's *Wonders of Elora* pp. 357—359.)

CHAPTER V.

Section 1. Grand design of the Mughals to surprise Malik Ambar ending in disaster (1612 A.D.).

The heavy discomfiture of the Mughals at Ahmadnagar had made a flutter at the Royal Court at Agra. The disgrace and loss of prestige, which the officers had brought about by their jealousy and supineness, must be wiped out ; and it was with this intention that the Khan-i-Khanan was recalled and Khan-i-Jahan was appointed to take up the command. But this transfer showed no improvement in the situation either at home or abroad. Criminations and recriminations among the officers continued unabated at the expense of Government duties, and, although Khan-i-Jahan tried his best to remedy the evils, he could not make any headway. His vain boasts were thus soon to end in nothing.

The Emperor devised another plan for subduing Malik Ambar. ✓ Abdulla Khan, who had recently rendered gallant services in Mewar (in Rajputana), was appointed Governor of Gujrat with instructions to lead an army to the Deccan to make a surprise attack upon Malik Ambar in concert with another army to be led by a different route. His hands were strengthened by the appointment of reliable and zealous lieutenants like Raja Ram Das, Khan-i-Alam, Saif Khan, Ali Mardan, and Zafar Khan, with a total strength of about fourteen thousand men. It was arranged that this party should proceed against Malik Ambar by way of Nasik and Trimbak, and the other party under the commands of Raja Man Singh, Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, and Sharif Khan, the Amir-ul-Umara, should move by way of Berar. These two parties would inform each other of their respective movements and regulate their marches and halts in such a way that they might take Malik Ambar by surprise between the two parties on an appointed day and eventually give him a crushing defeat. The plan was

thus an excellent one on paper, but it rested with the leaders to execute it in a proper and methodical way.

The two armies accordingly marched out in two different directions (1612 A.D.), but Abdulla Khan, puffed up with pride and vanity, considered himself a Rustam or an Afrasiyab capable of dealing effectively with Malik Ambar and omitted to harmonize his movements with those of the other party. He was burning with an irresistible desire for glory and was anxious to win the whole credit of the campaign. With such vain thoughts in his brain he marched on till he passed the Ghats and entered the Nizam Shahi territory.

On the other hand, when Malik Ambar got information of the approach of Abdulla Khan, he sent his light Marhatta horsemen together with the forces of Adil Shah, Qutb Shah, and Barid Shah, with whom he had formed a confederacy, to oppose and harass Abdulla Khan on the way and obstruct his progress. The Abyssinian chief was fully conscious of the military strength of the Mughals and, so, he followed

his predatory warfare as before. His guerilla bands began to harass Abdulla Khan from different directions ; they lured his army into difficult passes and craggy hills, skirmished with them every day, looted their baggages, cut off their supplies, and made their existence intolerable in every possible way. Even at night they were exposed to rockets and other fiery missiles. Although there was no open fight, Abdulla Khan's forces were daily decreasing due to heavy casualties, while Malik Ambar's followers were continually increasing with the influx of reinforcements. When Abdulla Khan arrived near Daulatabad, the capital of the Nizam Shahi kingdom, he found the situation too hot for him. Up till now he had not received any information of the Berar party which evidently was lagging behind.

With the heavy influx of Nizam Shahi troops, Malik Ambar made a vehement attack upon Abdulla Khan ¹⁵, who was now reduced to a sad

15. The battle was fought at Khirki and as Malik Ambar became victorious, he called it Fathnagar, or "city of victory." (Busatin-us-Salatin pp. 271—272)

plight. Driven to extremities, he had no other alternative than to retire; and with the approval of his chiefs, he commenced his retreat before dawn. But Malik Ambar did not allow him to retire in peace and the Deccani army hotly pursued him, harassing him all the way. Several skirmishes took place in the course of the retreat in which many brave and intrepid Mughal lieutenants like Ali Mardan Khan and Zulfaqar Beg perished. When Ali Mardan Khan fell seriously wounded on the battle-field, he was carried away to Daulatabad by the Nizam Shahis, where Malik Ambar appointed a surgeon for his treatment. But he died there after a few days.

This generous treatment of a fallen foe by Malik Ambar showed his chivalrous nature and nobility of character. He knew how to preserve the honour of a fallen foe, specially of a brave warrior, and he was far better than an ordinary adventurer, possessing, as he did, all the noble instincts of a knight.

The Nizam Shahi army followed the Mughals as far as the border of Baglana, which being a

friendly territory to the Mughals, they gave up the pursuit, whereupon Abdulla Khan retired with the remnant of his forces to Gujrat, and the Nizam Shahis to Daulatabad.

The Berar division of the imperial army had been dissatisfied with the behaviour of Abdulla Khan for not acting up to the concerted plan, and when they were informed of his retreat, they too turned back and joined Prince Parvez at Adilabad¹⁶ (1612 A.D.).¹⁷

It was evident that this great disaster to the Mughals was mainly due to the rashness and self-conceit of Abdulla Khan. He advanced against the enemy by a rapid march without

16. Adilabad is about 21 miles south-west of Burhanpur.

17. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 219—221 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 107—108 ; Iqbal-nama pp. 65—66 ; Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, p. 520 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 273-276 ; Busatin-us-Salatin pp. 271—272 ; Beveridge's Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. I, pp. 98—99, 185.

sending any news about his movements to the other party, so that when he was surrounded by the enemy, he found himself alone. The previous arrangement was thus upset, and he had to return disgraced and discomfited. As matters stood, the Berar party could not render any useful service, and it only spent its energy in forward and backward marches. Had Abdulla Khan maintained proper communications with that party and had he regulated his movements in concert with it, the expedition might have ended in success.

Section 2. Capital of the Nizam Shahi kingdom shifted from Daulatabad to Khirki.¹⁸

After this success Malik Ambar transferred his capital to the city of Khirki, which was at a distance of about ten miles from the fort of Daulatabad. It was a hilly region like Daulatabad and its natural barriers had attracted his special attention sometime back. Originally,

18. It was afterwards named Aurangabad by Aurangzeb.

it was a small hamlet named Khirki ; but finding its strategical importance he peopled it and then turned it into an important city in 1610 A.D. It was beautified with new buildings and houses, which ultimately turned it into the premier city of the kingdom. The grandeur and beauty of this new capital found encomium even in the pages of Mughal history ; Maasir-i-Rahimi says that it was not only the best city in the Deccan but the like of it was not to be found even in Hindusthan.¹⁹

Section 3. The Khan-i-Khanan again sent to the Deccan (1612 A.D.)—Death of Asaf Khan, the Amir-ul-Umara, and Raja Man Singh—Khan-i-Azam's transfer to Mewar.

When the news of Abdulla Khan's disaster

19. Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, p. 527.

"Aurangabad stands in a valley watered by the Dūdhnā between the Satara Hills on the south, and the Sichel range on the north which commences at Elorā and runs eastwards.....Here in 1616 A.D., he (Malik Ambar) erected the Nurkanda palace and mosque, and his army raised dwellings for themselves around it." (Report on the antiquities in the Bidar and Aurangabad districts by James Burgess p. 59).

The severe reverses which he had formerly suffered due to his rashness and negligence, as well as dissension and lack of support among his officials, were still fresh in his mind. First of all, he directed his attention to remove these defects before moving out in any campaign against Malik Ambar. A veteran and experienced politician as he was, he could well-manage to wait to rectify these internal drawbacks before giving a blow to his opponent.

He had a smooth sail for a considerable time and some of his antagonists, Asaf Khan, the Amir-ul-Umara, and Raja Man Singh were removed, one by one, by the invisible hand of Death. Asaf Khan died of a lingering illness at Burhanpur, the Amir-ul-Umara found his eternal rest in the pargana of Nihalpur (November 1612 A.D.), Khan-i-Azam was transferred to Mewar in 1613 A.D., and Raja Man Singh breathed his last in the middle of the next year.²¹

21. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 222, 281, 266 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 108, 113, 130.

Section 4. Plot to assassinate Malik Ambar and desertions from his camp.

Malik Ambar was not always prosperous, as no man can expect to be. Even Julius Cæsar and Napoleon Bonaparte, whose glorious achievements had once shaken the very foundations of the European monarchies, had to face, at one period or other, the gloomy vicissitudes of fortune.

It was through his untiring energy and extraordinary ability that Malik Ambar had stamped out all sedition from the kingdom. But again disaffection crept in among a section of the people who chafed and fretted under his rule. A secret plot was organized by some disaffected Rajputs to assassinate him. They placed themselves in an ambush, and finding a good opportunity, inflicted a wound on his person, but it proved to be slight, and the men who were in attendance upon him over-powered the Rajputs, killed them, and carried him safe to his quarters.²²

22. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, p. 275 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 134. In the Text Ambar is misprinted as Ghair.

But this was not all ; other disappointments were in store for him. Some of the influential nobles of the Nizam Shahi kingdom, Jadav Rao, Babaji Kayath, Uda Ram, Adam Khan, and Yaqut Khan, who had rendered invaluable services to him, being dissatisfied, deserted his cause, and joined the Mughals. They went to Shah Nawaz Khan in his camp at Balapur,²³ where they were all received with honour and cordiality by the Mughal lieutenant. He gave each of them money, an elephant, a horse, and a dress of honour according to his respective rank and position.²⁴

Section 5. Defeat of Malik Ambar—Khirki burnt (1616 A.D.).

Having won them over to the Mughal interest,

23. Balapur is about sixty miles, south-east of Burhanpur.

24. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 312—313 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 153 ; Iqbalnama pp. 84—85 ; Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, p. 523 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 282.

Shah Nawaz Khan took up the offensive against Malik Ambar and started towards Khirki.

On the other side, as the strength of Malik Ambar had been much reduced by the defection of these Nizam Shahi noblemen, he, as an astute politician, tried to make up for the loss by an alliance with the other Deccani Powers, Adil Shah, Qutb Shah, and Barid Shah. All of them responded to his call, and despatched necessary quotas of troops to his assistance; the first named sent twenty thousand cavalry and the second five thousand. Reinforced by this confederate army Malik Ambar remained at Khirki with forty thousand cavalry, while he sent fifteen thousand under Mahaldar Khan, Atash Khan, Dilwar Khan, Bijli Khan, and other leaders to check the progress of Shah Nawaz Khan.

As the Mughal lieutenant advanced beyond Jalna, he was continually harassed and plundered by this Deccani party but his strength eventually proved too much for them and they were

over-powered and compelled to turn back. He, then, proceeded on towards Khirki, but, in the mean-time, Malik Ambar, having heard of the defeat of his army, himself went out with his main forces to oppose him. The two parties met together at Rosalgarh near Khirki.

The fight, which was most sanguinary, began in right earnest from three o'clock in the afternoon, and as time passed on it assumed a serious proportion. In the end Darab Khan, who was the commander of the Mughal vanguard, made a dash into Malik Ambar's vanguard and vehemently attacked it in conjunction with his zealous lieutenants Raja Bir Singh Deo, Ali Khan Tatar, Jahangir Quli Beg, and Ray Chand. Unable to stem the tide of onset, the Deccani vanguard was scattered and disorganized. Darab Khan next fell upon Malik Ambar's centre. Here the fight was most desperate on both sides and lasted for two hours, heaps of corpses being left on the battle-field. The Mughals eventually came out successful and Malik Ambar, unable to continue the resistance, fell back. The Mughals pursued

him for a distance of about two or three kros, and when it was impossible to proceed further on account of the darkness of the night, they gave up the pursuit and turned back with a rich booty (February, 1616 A.D.).

Malik Ambar's loss was heavy. Among his forces many were killed or taken prisoner, and, those who escaped, were disunited and scattered. All his artillery, three hundred camels laden with rockets, many elephants, horses, and other war-materials fell into the hands of the enemy. Both Bijapur and Golconda also suffered a great loss ; and many of their forces were captured or killed. Among the captive Deccani leaders the most important were Ambar Bijapuri, Masnad Ali, and Bijli Khan, of whom the last two were put to death.

Next day the Mughals proceeded to Khirki, and, finding the city deserted by the Deccanis, they halted there for a few days. During this period they created havoc and destruction in it ; the beautiful city was set on fire and its buildings

levelled to the ground. After committing these atrocities and making the city desolate they left it and finally withdrew by the Rohankhed Pass.²⁵

But notwithstanding this defeat, Malik Ambar was far from being subdued, and the reverse could not make any lasting impression upon the Nizam Shahis. It was like a stroke on the surface of water which united as soon as the striking hand was removed. The Mughals did not follow up their victory by new acquisitions, and they only went to Khirki, burnt it, and then retired. The effect of the victory was thus only

25. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 313—314; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 153—154; Maasir-i-Rahimi Vol. II, pp. 523—531; Iqbalnama pp. 84—87; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 282—285.

“Rohankhed, a village situated a few miles north of Buldana, seems to have held in Berar in former days relatively the position held by Panipat in Northern India. It was a town situated on the high road from north to south, commanding the ascent to the Balaghat or the table-land of southern Berar.” (Historical Landmarks of the Deccan by Major T. W. Haig p. 162).

temporary. Malik Ambar soon revived from the shock of the defeat and made his position as strong as before. But, if, on the other hand, the Mughals had pursued him further and had followed up their victory with fresh conquests, one after another, Malik Ambar might have been humbled and his power crushed, but, as it was not done, the Nizam Shahi kingdom remained as strong and difficult to conquer as before.

Section 6. Malik Ambar and the deserters Adam Khan, Uda Ram, and others.

After the retirement of Shah Nawaz Khan Malik Ambar made an attempt to win over the deserters Adam Khan, Yaqut Khan, Jadav Rao, Babaji Kayath, and Uda Ram to his side, and through his effort and the intercession of Adil Shah he was successful in bringing them back to his side. All of them once more joined him, but trouble arose again with Adam Khan, Babaji Kayath, and Uda Ram with the result that Adam Khan was finally imprisoned at Daulatabad and put to death; Babaji Kayath and Uda Ram

tried to go over to the side of Adil Shah, but they found that door closed against them. During that time Babaji Kayath lost his life through the treachery of his partisans but Uda Ram offered a gallant opposition to Malik Ambar's forces and defeated them. At last, finding the Nizam Shahi country too hot for him, he entered the service of the Mughals when Shah Jahan came to the Deccan.²⁶

26. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 398—399 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 197.

CHAPTER VI.

Section 1. Prince Parvez recalled and Prince Khurram sent to the Deccan with the lofty title of "Shah" (1616 A.D.).

In spite of the presence of Prince Parvez in the Deccan the Mughals could not make satisfactory progress in the Nizam Shahi kingdom and it was evident that the Prince could not manage affairs with that amount of sagacity and ability which the circumstances demanded. Although the recent triumph of Shah Nawaz Khan had partially retrieved the Mughal prestige, it could not contribute anything solid and permanent. Moreover, the Khan-i-Khanan was still unable to unite his own house and his officers obstructed him in his actions. But the most serious evil was that he was suspected of bribery from the Deccanis.¹

Prince Khurram was considered to be the best man to tackle the difficult problem of conquering the Nizam Shahi kingdom. He was,

1. Sir Thomas Roe II, pp. 278—279.

therefore, posted there, vice Prince Parvez, who was transferred to Allahabad. It was also decided that the Emperor himself should proceed to Mandu in Malwa, which, on account of its proximity to the Deccan, would afford him better facilities for giving necessary support and instruction to Prince Khurram's army.

Towards the end of October 1616 A.D., the camp equipage of the Prince left for the south, and early in November he was given leave to proceed to his new province. But before his departure he was favoured with innumerable presents and honours, among which the most important was the title of "Shah" (king), which no Timurid Prince had ever before enjoyed. On Tuesday, the 10th November, 1616 A.D., the Emperor himself started for Mandu and reached there on the 6th March of the following year. Shah Khurram also entered Burhanpur on the same date.²

2. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 337—340 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 166—168 ; Iqbal-nama pp. 90—91 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 288.

Section 2. Shah Khurram married with the daughter of Shah Nawaz Khan.

After his arrival in Burhanpur Shah Khurram, according to the order of the Emperor, married the daughter of Shah Nawaz Khan and thus managed to contract an alliance with an able and influential Mughal nobleman there, who was now expected, by virtue of his new alliance, to render more enthusiastic support to the Prince. By this alliance the Emperor sought to make the ground smooth for a united and concerted action ; and besides, his personal presence at Mandu was expected to exert a more powerful influence in repressing all elements of distraction and disaffection among the nobles.³

Section 3. The Prince's diplomatic negotiations with the Deccani powers—Bijapur and Golconda offered submission.

The Prince had already started diplomatic negotiations with Adil Shah, Qutb Shah, and

3. Iqbalnama p. 100 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 291 ; Beveridge's Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. I, p. 57.

Malik Ambar through his reliable messengers, Afzal Khan and Raja Bikramjit, and a definite proposal of peace was offered to them on two conditions ; first, that they must relinquish their right over the territories which they had wrested from the Mughals, and secondly, that they must acknowledge Mughal suzerainty on the payment of tribute.

The missions ended in success. Ibrahim Adil Shah II, to whom the envoys first went, received them with great honour and dignity, and realizing the extensive preparation of the Mughals and the gravity of the danger to his State, he preferred to come to terms rather than fight against such heavy odds. He, therefore, accepted the Prince's offer, and as a mark of respect personally waited upon him with a befitting present of horses, elephants, jewels, and other valuables, worth fifteen lakhs of rupees. The Prince was highly satisfied with his conduct and at his request the Emperor distinguished him with the title of "Farzand" or son (son of the Emperor). The following couplets were written

by the Emperor himself at the beginning of the farman :—

“Thou’st become, at Shah Khurram’s request, Renowned in the world as my son (farzand).”

Qutb-ul-Mulk likewise received the envoy of the Prince with cordiality, gave him a suitable present, and offered submission and loyalty to the Mughal Government.⁴

Section 4. Malik Ambar offered submission to the Mughals (1617 A.D.).

The position of Malik Ambar was thus rendered extremely precarious by the submission of Bijapur and Golconda, and the gravity of the situation bewildered him. Up till now he had steered successfully even through the most perplexing and desperate situation, but never before was he confronted with so great a danger. Both Adil Shah and Qutb Shah had rendered him

4. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 368, 387—388 ; Syed’s Ahmad’s Persian Text pp. 182, 191—192 ; Iqbalnama pp. 100—102 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 290—292 ; Beveridge’s Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. I, pp. 57—58.

timely assistance on several occasions in his days of adversity, but now as they were Mughal partisans, he could not expect any assistance from them. Besides, Adil Shah held out hopes to the Mughals to restore to them those territories of which Malik Ambar had taken possession, and he was exerting his influence to compel him to come to terms with them. It was therefore not judicious for Malik Ambar to provoke the enmity of these combined powers, the consequence of which might be nothing short of the total annihilation of the Nizam Shahi kingdom.

The only alternative was to buy peace by the cession of Ahmadnagar with its surrounding districts as well as of the parganas of Balaghat which he had wrested from the Mughals. It was, no doubt, a heavy price for peace, but he had to yield; and the conquered provinces once more reverted to the Mughals.⁵

5. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, p. 380; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 188; Iqbalnama p. 100; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 291; Beveridge's Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. I, p. 58.

This sacrifice was a bitter necessity to Malik Ambar. He had to submit only because the circumstances left him no other choice ; and his reasons for accepting such a humiliating peace were two-fold ; first, that although by the surrender of those territories the kingdom was much reduced, his independence remained intact, and he was of opinion that however the branches might be cut off, if the trunk remained, it might again grow up to its full height and spread new branches far and wide. Secondly, this peace was only a means of warding off a national crisis and of enabling him to wait for a better opportunity to cast off all the shackles imposed upon him. He had, however, no mind to stick to the peace-terms and he would be only too glad to tear up the treaty as a scrap of paper at the earliest opportunity. As a far-sighted politician he thus chose to wait rather than to jump into a hasty action.

Section 5. Arrangements for the administration of the Deccan—Shah Khurram's return to Mandu and his grand reception by the Emperor.

After this success Shah Jahan turned towards

the defence and proper administration of the conquered provinces. The Khan-i-Khanan was appointed Subahdar of Khandesh, Berar, and Ahmadnagar, and his son Shah Nawaz Khan posted in the conquered territory with 12,000 cavalry⁶ to hold it. Ahmadnagar was placed in charge of Khanjar Khan, and reliable officers were also appointed to all other stations. After these arrangements 30,000 cavalry and 7,000 foot musketeers were retained for services in the Deccan ; while the Prince himself left Burhanpur with the remaining 25,000 cavalry and 2,000 gunners, accompanied by his distinguished lieutenants Khan-i-Jahan Lodi, Darab Khan, Abdulla Khan, Sardar Khan, Mahabat Khan, Shajaat Khan, and Uda Ram.

On the 12th October, 1617 A.D., he met his father at Mandu, where he was accorded a grand reception. He was taken to the *jharoka* and the

6. Khafi Khan says 2,000 cavalry and it is obviously a mistake (Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 292).

Emperor himself, rising up from his seat, held him in embrace. He was promoted to an unprecedented mansab of 30,000 personal and 20,000 horse and was endowed with the lofty title of Shah Jahan. As a mark of further distinction he was given the special privilege of sitting on a chair near the throne in darbar. "A special dress of honour with a gold embroidered charqab, with collar, the end of the sleeves and the skirt decorated with pearls worth 50,000 rupees, a jewelled sword with a jewelled pardala (belt), and a jewelled dagger were bestowed upon him." His officers were also honoured with the royal interview and suitable presents.⁷ An exuberance of joy prevailed in the Royal Court at the success of the Prince. He had achieved by peace what Prince Parvez and the Khan-i-Khanan could not do by arms.

On the other hand, it must also be said that too much parade of Shah Jahan's achievements

7. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, pp. 393—395 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 194—195; Iqbal-nama pp. 101—104 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 292—293.

was made by the Royal Court. Neither did his achievements amount to the subversion of any independent kingdom, nor were they of any such unprecedented nature as might have warranted these high-sounding titles, promotions, and exuberance of joy. This only proved the military degeneracy of the Mughals, which was unable to solve the Deccan problem and made a mountain out of a molehill. Akbar's arms had wrought much more astounding deeds, but they had been followed by less exhibition and exuberance.

Section 6. Malik Ambar's renewed activities—Ahmadnagar and Burhanpur besieged (1620-1621 A.D.). The Khan-i-Khanan's petition for relief to the Emperor.

After the peace-treaty Malik Ambar remained quiet for sometime and waited patiently for an opportunity to drive out the Mughals. He closely watched their movements and was on the lookout for taking them unawares in any convenient hour. At last, such an opportunity came to him after the lapse of two years. Shah Jahan

was away in the far off Punjab busy in the siege of Kangra, the Emperor was enjoying the delightful atmosphere of Kashmir, and in the absence of these vigilant eyes the Mughal officers in the Deccan went on with their quarrels and petty jealousies. The great lieutenant Shah Nawaz Khan, who had done gallant services and worked so much to retrieve the Mughal prestige in the Deccan, died in the previous year (1619 A.D.).

Malik Ambar did not lose sight of such an opportunity. He again made an alliance with Adil Shah and Qutb Shah, who likewise broke away from their peace-terms and joined hands with him to expel the Mughals from the south. With about 60,000 cavalry he made a sudden attack upon the Mughal territory in Ahmadnagar, conquering all the places through which he passed and compelled Khanjar Khan, the officer in charge of Ahmadnagar, to take shelter in the fort. It was besieged and a party was posted there to carry on the siege, while the main force moved towards Berar, conquering as before all the places through which he proceeded. One by one, the Mughal

commanders were forced to surrender their stations and fall back to join Darab Khan, who had succeeded his brother, Shah Nawaz Khan, as Governor of Berar and Ahmadnagar. But they were hotly chased by the Marhatta forces. Two or three pitched battles were fought between the two parties and although the Mughals were victorious, they did not profit by their victory, as the Deccanis used to rally together just after defeat and would make sudden sallies upon them the next moment.

Malik Ambar had taken up his position at Mehkar,⁸ and from thence he was harassing them from all sides ; their camps were plundered, their supply of provision cut off, and the surrounding country devastated. For three months the fighting went on and, at last, want of provision compelled them to leave Balaghat and retreat to Balapur. But there also they were not immune from distress and the environs of Balapur were plundered and devastated. The Mughals, then,

8. Mehkar is situated about forty miles southwest of Balapur.

made an attempt to compel the Deccanis to come to an open engagement, and with about 6,000 to 7,000 well-trained cavalry they made a surprise attack on their camp. A hard contest took place between the two parties resulting in a severe defeat of Malik Ambar's forces. His camp was looted and many of his followers were killed or taken prisoner. Laden with a rich booty the Mughals returned to their camp, but as soon as they fell back Malik Ambar's forces again attacked them from different directions and hotly pursued them as far as their camp at Balapur. It was with great difficulty and with a considerable loss of men that they were able to return to their camp. Balapur was then made the target of Ambar's attack. The Mughals remained there for about four months, but they were hard-pressed and reduced to a sorry plight. Want of provisions again distressed them so much that many of them left their camp and joined Malik Ambar. This contagion was so alarming, that the Mughals left Balapur and marched northwards to Burhanpur specially because no succour was forth coming. But Malik Ambar did not

allow them to retire unmolested, and he pursued them as far as Burhanpur when they were compelled to take shelter in the walled city. He now laid siege to the fort itself and devastated the whole country around it (1620 A. D.).

Besides the environment of Ahmadnagar, which had been occupied at the outset of the campaign many parganas of Berar and Khandesh thus fell into his hands, but he was not content with these and, being determined to stamp out Mughal greed of annexation in the southern territories, he crossed the Narbada, plundered the surroundings of Mandu, and burnt the villages.

There had been consternation in Burhanpur and not to speak of the Mughal possessions in Ahmadnagar or Balaghat the lives of the Mughal soldiery were at stake. For six months they remained confined in the fort till reinforcements came from the north. The Khan-i-Khanan had applied more than once to the Emperor for relief and his real situation could be inferred from the fact that he was reported to have determined to

follow the Hindu custom of jauhar (self-immolation) to get eternal deliverance from these awful difficulties.⁹

Section 7. Shah Jahan sent to the Deccan for the second time (December 1620 A.D.)—Malik Ambar's retreat and the destruction of Khirki.

When the news of these disasters reached the Emperor, he decided to send Shah Jahan again to the Deccan. After the conquest of Kangra (in the Punjab), elaborate preparations were made for his departure, and with 1,000 Turkish musketeers, 1,000 gunners on foot, 1,000 Ahadis, 650 Mansabdars, and a large train of artillery and elephants he was sent off for the relief of the Khan-i-Khanan.

At Ujjain he got the information that the Deccanis were still engaged in rapine and plunder

9. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. II, pp. 155—157, 188—190 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 305, 321—322 ; Iqbalnama pp. 175, 181 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 304—305, 314 ; Beveridge's Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. I, pp. 58—59 ; The English Factories in India (1618—1621 A. D.) pp. 207, 210, 211, 217, 218, 231, 240, 243, 249, 257, 259, 287, 296—for dislocation of trade.

in the environment of Mandu, and, consequently, he despatched an advanced force of 5,000 cavalry under Abul Hasan to expel them from those quarters. Abul Hasan hurried to the scene and in co-operation with the forces at Mandu, he rushed upon the enemy, worsted them, and drove them back across the Narbada. Many Deccanis were slain, and after pursuing them for a considerable distance he checked his advance, and according to the order of the Prince, waited on the southern bank of the river till the arrival of the main force. The Prince soon arrived and the whole army hurried to Burhanpur which was still in a state of siege.

On their approach Malik Ambar, who did not like to hazard an open engagement with this huge force of well-trained and well-equipped cavalry under the leadership of an able general like Shah Jahan, raised the siege and retreated to the south.

Shah Jahan halted for nine days at Burhanpur to give relief to his worn out and fatigued army;

after which, he resumed his activities. He was well-acquainted with the nature of the Deccanis' warfare and he knew what would follow if they were allowed to retreat unmolested. His swift and veteran cavaliers gave them a hot chase and afforded them no opportunity to change their course to make a sudden sally. The chase was too much for them. Many were over-powered and slain, and the rest retired to Khirki, but Shah Jahan followed them even there.

✓ Fortunately for Malik Ambar he had removed the Nizam Shah with his family in time to the fortress of Daulatabad and himself had encamped outside it in an advantageous ground with his front on marshy lands and his back to the fort. Khirki was thus left open to the mercy of the invaders, and when the Mughals arrived there, they met with no opposition worth mentioning. They occupied the city without any difficulty and halted there for three days in the course of which the whole city was destroyed with all its

beautiful houses and decorated buildings (1621 A.D.).¹⁰

Section 8. Peace concluded between Shah Jahan and Malik Ambar.

After their halt for three days at Khirki the Mughal forces marched towards Ahmadnagar which had been besieged by the Nizam Shahis. But when they reached Paithan on the Godavari, Malik Ambar opened negotiations for peace.

In the meantime the situation at Ahmadnagar also turned in favour of the Mughals. The Nizam Shahis, frightened at the approach of the heavy Mughal reinforcements, gave up the siege, and retired from that region. But Shah Jahan's want of provisions due to the devastation of the surrounding country greatly alarmed him and the grim apprehension of complete starvation hung upon him like a nightmare.

10. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. II, pp. 190, 206—208; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text pp. 322, 330—331; Iqbalnama pp. 176, 181—182; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 315—321.

So, when Malik Ambar offered terms of peace, he availed himself of the opportunity and a treaty was concluded between them on the following terms :—

All the territories which had been in the possession of the Mughals two years back but which Malik Ambar had occupied in the meantime, should be restored to the Mughals ; in addition to this Malik Ambar also abandoned his right over fourteen kros of the adjoining country. Moreover, fifty lakhs of rupees were to be paid as tribute by the three powers—Nizam Shah, Adil Shah, and Qutb Shah, jointly. After the ratification of the treaty and completion of all other arrangements the Prince returned to Burhanpur.¹¹

This treaty, therefore, terminated in favour of the Mughals and Malik Ambar had to yield once more to the demands of Shah Jahan (1621

11. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. II, p. 208 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 331 ; Iqbalnama pp. 182—188 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 322.

A.D.). This campaign proved once more that Shah Jahan was the fittest man to handle the Deccani politics and it was due to his tactics and superior generalship that the Mughals gained such a grand victory. If Shah Jahan had not appeared in the Deccan at that particular moment and had not rescued the Mughals from the great danger, Deccan History might have had a different tale to tell. In all probability, the Mughals would have been driven across the Narbada, and Malik Ambar would have got the entire mastery of the situation. But as his ambition was again checked, he waited in bitter discontent to make amends for his losses.

Section 9. Desertion of Jadav Rao from Malik Ambar (1621 A. D.).

The year of this defeat also witnessed the desertion of Jadav Rao, the influential Nizam Shahi nobleman, who left Malik Ambar and joined the Mughal service. The cause of his desertion was his rivalry and animosity with

Kheloji Bhonsla, another Nizam Shahi nobleman, and his brothers whom the Nizam Shah supported at the cost of that nobleman's (Jadav Rao's) interests. Apprehending some mischief, Jadav Rao went over to the Mughals, by whom he was highly rewarded and distinguished. A total mansab of 24,000 with 15,000 horse was granted to him and to those of his relatives, who accompanied him; they were all favoured with high posts. The desertion of such an influential nobleman was a serious loss to Malik Ambar.¹²

12. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. II, p. 218; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 337; Iqbalnama p. 187; Khafi Khan Vol. I, p. 325; Shiva Bharat Chapter IV Slokas 1—3; Grant Duff—A history of the Marhattas Vol. I, p. 96.

CHAPTER VII

Section 1. Rebellion of Shah Jahan and his attempt to make alliance with Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II.

In 1622 A. D., Shah Jahan was ordered to go to the relief of Qandahar in Afghanistan which had been besieged by the Persian king Shah Abbas II. But the serious illness of the Emperor Jahangir coupled with the machinations of Nur Jahan Begam to oust him from the throne, called forth the Prince's unwillingness to obey the royal mandate, upon which Nur Jahan Begam made a dexterous use of the refusal and succeeded in estranging the heart of the Emperor from his beloved son. Perceiving what was in store for him, Shah Jahan went into open rebellion, and in this action of resistance to his father he was successful in enlisting the sympathy of most of the Mughal lieutenants posted in the Deccan.

Accompanied by his able commanders he left the fort of Mandu, which had recently been made

his Headquarters, and marched towards the north. He proceeded as far as Fatehpur Sikri and as its gates were closed against him, he could not make any progress there, but another force under the leadership of Raja Bikramjit plundered the un-walled town of Agra and realized an immense booty from it.

But Shah Jahan's army was soon to receive the shock of a severe defeat at Bilochpur, south of Delhi, where a great battle took place between him and the Royalists. He was not only defeated there, but one of his most efficient and reliable lieutenants, Raja Bikramjit, was killed in the engagement. These losses were too much for him ; after this, he had to pass through many vicissitudes of fortune and desertions from his camp, till at last, he was compelled to move to the south in a miserable plight.

There he tried to enlist the support of Adil Shah and Malik Ambar, his old enemies, to whom he sent his reliable agent Afzal Khan with suitable

presents. It was indeed an irony of fortune that the Prince, who had once wielded almost unlimited authority in the Deccan, was now wistfully looking forward to his antagonists for assistance (1623 A. D.) !

But Malik Ambar cleverly managed to evade the demands of the Prince and advised Afzal Khan to go first to Adil Shah, whom he considered as his master, and if Adil Shah would agree to help the Prince, he would follow his master ; so, Afzal Khan went to Adil Shah.

The motive which actuated Malik Ambar to evade the request of the Prince was obvious. First, he did not like to entangle himself in warfare at this stage for a fugitive Prince. Without benefiting him in any way, this offer of assistance might put him to further embarrassments, as the Prince was being chased by a Mughal general of rare genius like Mahabat Khan in concert with a member of the Royal family—Prince Parvez. Secondly, Malik Ambar was eager to

contract an alliance with the Mughal Government with a view to coercing Adil Shah with whom, of late, he had not been on good terms. He was, therefore, not at all willing to give any cause of provocation to Mahabat Khan and Prince Parvez, but, on the contrary, he was on the lookout to please them to gain his object. No wonder, then, that he politely avoided compliance with the request of Shah Jahan by means of diplomacy, and cleverly sent Afzal Khan to Adil Shah with the idea that if the latter accepted the invitation of Shah Jahan, it would be easier for him to gain the Mughal alliance. If Adil Shah would fall within the snare, Ambar might have a smooth sail, but, if on the contrary, he would reject the proposal of Shah Jahan, there was no harm, as no evil was likely to come to Ambar out of it.

From Malik Ambar Afzal Khan went to Ibrahim Adil Shah II, but the latter also was not favourably inclined towards Shah Jahan, and he openly accorded bad treatment to the envoy. Afzal Khan was thus baffled in his

mission, and he could neither enlist the sympathy of Malik Ambar nor that of Adil Shah.¹

Ibrahim Adil Shah II, too, was perfectly aware of the strained feeling prevailing between him and Malik Ambar, and he was similarly looking forward to gain Mughal support to subvert his adversary. It was this motive which prompted him as well to reject the proposals of the Prince.

Shah Jahan's prospects now seemed to be very gloomy ; one disappointment after another came upon him, and he was finally obliged to leave the Deccan and proceed to Northern India through Telingana and Orissa.

Section 2. Causes of dispute between Ibrahim Adil Shah II and Malik Ambar.

A variety of causes were at work to bring about a breach between Malik Ambar and Adil

1. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. II, p. 290 ; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 378.

Shah. Bijapur and Ahmadnagar being contiguous States, frequent disputes had occurred between them in the past over the bordering territories, and each tried to extend its boundary at the expense of the other. The fort of Sholapur, which was situated on the border of both was, in particular, a bone of contention between them. Moreover, when Ahmadnagar first fell into the hands of the Mughals in August, 1600 A.D., Ibrahim Adil Shah II, finding it a grand opportunity, annexed some of the neighbouring Nizam Shahi territories to his kingdom, and this spirit of aggrandizement lurked beneath his activities even afterwards. Moreover, the rise of Malik Ambar and, with it, the restoration of the Nizam Shahi kingdom, was a menace to Adil Shah's safety, and he meditated plans for curbing its power. To this feeling was added the selfish greed of the the Adil Shahi nobles, who looked with a sense of extreme jealousy at the ascendancy of Malik Ambar and were eager to bring about his fall and parcel out the fallen Nizam Shahi kingdom amongst themselves. The presence of Nizam

Shahi deserters like Farhad Khan and others, who had taken shelter in the Adil Shahi kingdom, further augmented the strained feeling between the two states.

On the other hand, Malik Ambar also was eager to win back the old possessions of the Nizam Shahi kingdom, which had been occupied by Adil Shah during the interregnum ; and consequently, when the interests of both the States ran counter to each other, a gulf was inevitable between them.

Section 3. Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II applied for aid to Mahabat Khan, the Mughal General, the latter decided in favour of Adil Shah (1624 A. D.).

After their rupture both Malik Ambar and Adil Shah were trying hard to gain Mughal assistance to reduce their respective rival, and the matter came to a head in April, 1624 A. D., when Malik Ambar sent one of his reliable agents Ali Sher to the Mughal general Mahabat Khan, who

was then virtually in charge of the Deccan affairs, offering his submission and fidelity. He even went so far as to give his eldest son to the service of the Mughals and personally wait upon Mahabat Khan at Dewalgaon, about sixty miles south of Burhanpur. But Adil Shah similarly showed his fealty to him and promised to send 5,000 cavalry under his "principal agent and minister" Mulla Muhammad Lari for continual service under the Mughal Government.

The Mughal general finally decided in favour of Adil Shah and rejected Malik Ambar's overtures.² The position of Malik Ambar was thus rendered very awkward and this Mughal-Bijapuri alliance hung upon him like a nightmare, throwing him into an alarming solitude.

Section 4. Malik Ambar's alliance with Golconda.

According to his promise Adil Shah sent 5,000 cavalry under the leadership of Mulla

2. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. II, p. 296; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 381; Iqbalnama p. 223; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 343—344.

Muhammad Lari to Burhanpur ; but, as the latter was apprehensive of Malik Ambar's attack on the way, Mahabat Khan despatched a strong Mughal detachment to Balaghat to escort him safely to Burhanpur.

But Malik Ambar was not then so much interested in the movements of the Bijapuri general as he was in his own safety. He made Khirki empty and removed the Nizam Shah with his family to the fortress of Daulatabad, while he himself moved towards Qandahar, on the borders of Qutb-ul-Mulk, principally intent upon forming an alliance with Golconda, but gave out the purpose of the journey as the realization of the fixed subsidy (Zar-i-mukarrari) which had fallen into arrears for the two years past.

He, however, realized the two years' revenue from Golconda which had been in arrears, and at the same time concluded an alliance with it, thus removing one anxiety.³

3. *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition pp. 386, 391 ; *Iqbalnama* pp. 224, 234 ; *Khafi Khan Vol. I*, p. 347.

Section 5. Mahabat Khan and Prince Parvez left the Deccan after the completion of all arrangements for its administration—Malik Ambar's attack upon Bijapur.

Malik Ambar's absence in a distant place enabled Mulla Muhammad Lari to journey in safety towards Burhanpur, and after his arrival and cordial reception at the Mughal Camp Prince Parvez and Mahabat Khan made all necessary arrangements for the administration of the Deccan in their absence, as they had to proceed immediately to Northern India in order to check the progress of the rebel Prince Shah Jahan. Sarbuland Rai was placed in sole charge of Deccan affairs with his Headquarters at Burhanpur, Rizvi Khan was posted in charge of the defence of Khandesh, Minuchihr, the son of Shah Nawaz Khan, was despatched to Jalna, and Asad Khan Mamuri to Elichpur. Jadav Rao and Uda Ram, who had at first taken up the side of Shah Jahan, but, who, later on had given up his cause and joined the Royalists, were ordered along with

Lashkar Khan and other officers to defend Balaghat. Mulla Muhammad Lari was to remain at Burhanpur with his 5,000 contingent, and his son Aminuddin was ordered to serve the Prince with another contingent of 5,000, and both of them were favoured with rich presents and rewards.⁴

After these arrangements Prince Parvez and Mahabat Khan left the Deccan in compliance with the royal mandate. But their departure upset the whole situation in the Deccan and it was a signal for Malik Ambar's renewed activities. After the ratification of the pact with Golconda, Malik Ambar pushed on with his contemplated attack upon Ibrahim Adil Shah II and hastened to Bidar⁵ which had been in the possession of Adil Shah since 1619 A. D. There

4. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. II, p. 296; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 381; Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition p. 386; Iqbalnama p. 224.

5. Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri makes it "Bander" which is a printing mistake (Syed Ahmad's Text p. 391), Iqbalnama is correct (p. 234), but in Khafi Khan's Text the same mistake occurs (Vol. I, p. 347).

he took the Bijapuri officers by surprise, routed them completely, and plundered the city. Laden with a rich booty he next proceeded towards Bijapur itself, the capital of Adil Shah, but Ibrahim Adil Shah II, being unable to withstand him in the open field, shut himself up in the walled city.⁶

Section 6. Mulla Muhammad Lari and the Mughal Officers started for the relief of Adil Shah.

Besieged by Malik Ambar in his very capital, Adil Shah had no alternative but to recall Mulla Muhammad Lari with his forces from Burhanpur and look to Sarbuland Rai for Mughal assistance. As soon as Mulla Muhammad Lari received the summons of his master and heard of the alarming circumstances under which he

6. Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition p. 391 ; Iqbalnama p. 234 ; Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 347—348.

had been compelled to recall him, he begged leave of Sarbuland Rai for his immediate relief. But Sarbuland Rai was not inclined to part with him in the absence of any specific order from Prince Parvez or Mahabat Khan, especially as he had not a sufficient force with him to warrant his marching to Adil Shah's relief. Mulla Muhammad Lari, then, gave three lakhs of huns, which were equivalent to about twelve lakhs of rupees, to the Mughal officers at Burhanpur to purchase Mughal aid. When Adil Shah's letters for assistance reached Mahabat Khan, although he was far away from the scene of action, he also realized the gravity of the situation and directed the Mughal officers to send immediate relief to Adil Shah in conjunction with Mulla Muhammad Lari. In compliance with this order Sarbuland Rai made extensive preparations and despatched Lashkar Khan, Mirza Minuchihr, Rizvi Khan, Jadav Rao, Uda Ram, Khanjar Khan, the Governor of Ahmadnagar, Jansipar Khan, the Governor of Bir, and all other Mughal nobles and mansabdars of the Deccan with Mulla

Muhammad Lari, while he himself remained with a small contingent at Burhanpur.⁷

Section 7. Circumstances leading to the battle of Bhatvadi.⁸

This heavy reinforcement of the Bijapuris by the Mughal forces created grave anxiety in the mind of Malik Ambar and he opened negotiations with the Mughal officers, requesting them to desist from supporting Adil Shah and to allow Nizam Shah and Adil Shah to decide their long-standing differences between themselves. In the course of his request he emphasized his loyalty to the Mughal Government and stated that both he and Adil Shah were servants of the same master ; why, then, were the Mughal generals proceeding to crush him at the instigation of Adil Shah and Mulla Muhammad Lari ? The Mughal officers paid no heed to his remonstrances and

7. *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition pp. 391—392 ; *Iqbalnama* pp. 234—235 ; *Dilkasha* Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. pp. 90—91.

8. The Marhatta spelling is adopted here.

they proceeded on. He repeated his appeal more earnestly, but it produced no better effect. At last, they compelled him to give up the siege of Bijapur and retreat northwards to his own territory, but while he was retreating they pursued him at close quarters and made every attempt to corner him in a desperate position. The gravity of the situation forced him to make further attempts at conciliation, but they proved futile as before.

At Taligaon near Koregaon he crossed the river Bhima hotly pursued by the confederate army, and thus goaded to desperation he had no other choice but to fall back on Bhatvadi,⁹ about ten miles south east by east of the fort of Ahmadnagar, and on the western bank of the Keli Nadi, a feeder of the Sina.

He cut the embankment of the Bhatvadi lake and let out its water which barred the path of the

9. It owes its name to the Bhatvadi lake built by Salabat Khan, the minister of the fourth Nizam Shahi sovereign Murtaza Nizam Shah I.

Mughals and Bijapuris. Abundance of mud and mire made their position very weak ; heavy rainfall, moreover, added to their misery. But what was still worse was the scarcity of provisions. Not to speak of men, even the quadrupeds did not get any food for two or three successive nights, and both men and animals at last became incapable of moving. At Mulla Muhammad's request, provision was sent by Adil Shah, but the convoy could not reach the distressed army, owing to the fear of Malik Ambar's attack on the way. The sufferings of the army reached the climax, and the natural consequence was that many desertions followed both from the Mughal and the Bijapuri camps.

When they were thus struggling against these adverse circumstances Malik Ambar used to make night attacks upon them, "which created such a panic in them that they passed their days without repose and nights without sleep." Ambar's forces were daily increasing owing to fresh reinforcements, but those of the Mughals and the Bijapuris were daily dwindling away. The

Nizam Shahi chief now gave up night attacks and began to make surprise attacks by day, and looted and plundered his enemy's camps. The rival camps were posted only two or three kros apart and retaliation also followed from the Mughal and Bijapuri sides, but the latter were labouring under great disadvantages—"famine and hunger, disunion, two hearts, two languages, excess of rain"—which ruined them.¹⁰

Section 8. The battle of Bhatvadi and its results (October, 1624 A.D.).

In that memorable battle-field he rallied round him the best forces and the most valiant and skilful generals, of whom the Nizam Shahi kingdom might well be proud. Among them were

10. *Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi* 289a, 289b, 290b; *Tatimmat-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition p. 392; *Iqbalnama* p. 236; *Khafi Khan Vol. I*, p. 348; *Tarikh-i-Shivaji* 7b.

Shahji,^{10(a)} the father of Shivaji, Sharifji, Mudhaji of Phaltan, Vithalraj, Kheloji, the son of Vithalraj, Hambir Rai Chauhan, Nagoji Rao, Atash Khan, Yaqut Khan, Mansur Khan, Jauhar Khan, and Fateh Khan, the son of Malik Ambar, all of whom were famous for their intrepidity and military craftsmanship.

10a. Of all historians, Fuzuni alone says that Shahji deserted Malik Ambar in the battle of Bhatvadi (Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi 288b, 291b). But it is a palpable mistake. Shiva Bharat clearly says that Shahji fought for Malik Ambar (Chap. IV, slokas 10,65). Neither Iqbalnama nor Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri mentions the name of Shahji amongst the Nizam Shahi deserters. But both of them agree in saying that Jadav Rao and Uda Ram were on the Mughal side. Shahji was then a powerful factor in the Nizam Shahi kingdom and had he deserted to the Mughals, his name must have been mentioned by the Mughal historians. Fuzuni made similar mistakes in the cases of some other Marhatta names too. In his opinion Babaji Kayath and Adam Khan, also, were on the Mughal side in the battle of Bhatvadi (Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi 288b, 291b), but it should be mentioned here that Adam Khan had long been put to death by Malik Ambar, and Babaji Kayath had also lost his life through the treachery of his partisans (Vide p. 80).

On the opposite side, too, there was no paucity of intrepid warriors and able commanders and both the Mughals and the Bijapuris had brought with them their best troops and most experienced generals. Among the famous Mughal generals were Lashkar Khan, Khanjar Khan, Mirza Minuchihr and Jadav Rao ; and on the Bijapuri side were Mulla Muhammad Lari, Ikhlas Khan, Masud Khan, Farhad Khan, and Dilwar Khan.

Both parties arranged their forces according to the customary Indian division of centre, right, left, vanguard, and rear. The battle was not a hard contested one, as the organization and spirit of both the Mughal and Bijapuri armies had greatly deteriorated owing to the causes mentioned in the last section. There was not only discord between the Mughals and their Bijapuri allies, but internal quarrels were rampant even among the Bijapuri leaders themselves ; Mulla Muhammad's premature end was ascribed to the latter cause."

II. (Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi 291a). Fuzuni has given us a beautiful description of the battle of Bhatvadi, and that from the Bijapuri side ; it is both reliable and satisfactory. The accounts of Iqbalnama and Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri are here scanty and are of less credence, when they clash with those of Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi. Both the above Mughal histories ascribe the death of Mulla Muhammad to his enemy's hands, and the upset of the Bijapuri forces to his fall ; but the version of Fuzuni may be taken as more reliable.

The defeat of the confederate army was complete, and the losses on both the Mughal and Bijapuri sides were heavy (October, 1624 A.D.).

They were now flying as fugitives from place to place, but Malik Ambar's hot pursuit overcame most of them, and innumerable Mughal and Bijapuri soldiers with their officers fell prisoners into his hands. Among the Adil Shahi commanders captured were Ikhlas Khan and twentyfive others, including Farhad Khan, who had been an old enemy of Malik Ambar and who had sought his death ; the latter was put to death and the rest were imprisoned. Among the Mughal officers taken prisoner were Lashkar Khan, Abul Hasan, Mirza Minuchihr, Aqedat Khan with his son, and fortytwo other mansabdars. With great difficulty Khanjar Khan escaped to the fort of Ahmadnagar, and Jansipar Khan to that of Bir,

and among the rest of the Mughal fugitives some took shelter in Ahmadnagar and others in Burhanpur.¹²

Thus Malik Ambar came out successful against heavy odds of the Mughal and Bijapuri forces. The battle of Bhatvadi was one of the most decisive battles in the history of the Deccan, and its results were momentous and far-reaching. If Athens could well be proud of its Marathon and its hero Miltiades, and Mewar of its Haldighat and Rana Pratap, Ahmadnagar was no less proud of its Bhatvadi and its hero Malik Ambar. It not only saved the Nizam Shahi kingdom from extinction, but made its position unique

12. *Fatuhat-i-Adil Shahi* 290b, 291a, 291b, tr. by Sir J. N. Sarkar. *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition p. 392; *Iqbalnama* pp. 236—237; *Khafī Khan* Vol. I, pp. 348—349; *Shiva Bharat* Chapter IV Slokas 10—66; *Dilkasha* p. 92; *Maasir-ul-Umara* Vol. I, p. 143.

in the Deccan and created a moral force and self-confidence in the minds of the Nizam Shahis. The pride and vindictive nature of the Mughal and Bijapuri officers were humbled; Mulla Muhammad Lari was slain, and the Mughal leader Khanjar Khan had to be contented with the life of a prisoner at Daulatabad.

The victory proved, beyond doubt, the superiority of Malik Ambar's talents and military genius. His followers, specially the Marhatta bands, proved their fidelity to their master, and one of their heroes Sharifji fell fighting bravely. Just as Marathon became a magic word to the Athenians, and Haldighat to the Rajputs, Bhatvadi became similarly a magic word to the Nizam Shahis.

When the news of this disaster to the Mughal forces reached Burhanpur, it created a panic there. The heavy losses of men and money, made Sarbuland Rai almost desperate with remorse and anxiety, and it was now impossible to check the progress of the Abyssinian hero. It was

apparent that all the Nizam Shahi territories at present in possession of the Mughals would revert to their original owner.

Section 9. Malik Ambar's siege of Bijapur—his conquest of Balaghat—Sholapur stormed.

After sending his prisoners to Daulatabad Malik Ambar marched post-haste to Ahmadnagar and laid siege to the fort. But Khanjar Khan, the officer in charge of it, who had narrowly made his escape from captivity at Bhatvadi, showed a bold front and repulsed all his attacks. As its conquest was delayed, Malik Ambar left a detachment to keep up the investment, while he himself proceeded against Bijapur. This time, too, Ibrahim Adil Shah II was unable to oppose him in an open engagement, and, again, he took refuge in the fortress, but Malik Ambar laid siege to it. At the same time, he attacked the territories of Adil Shah, one after another, and occupied all of them as far as the Mughal frontier in Balaghat. He then gathered together

an excellent army and laid siege to the fort of Sholapur, but it held out bravely for sometime. The resistance was, however, short-lived and Malik Ambar, having brought up guns from Daulatabad, stormed it ¹³ (1625 A.D.).

Section 10. Siege of Burhanpur and Shah Jahan's friendship with Malik Ambar.

In the meantime a strong detachment of 10,000 cavalry was despatched under the leadership of Yaqut Khan against Burhanpur. Yaqut Khan went as far as Malkapur, about forty miles south of Burhanpur, and plundered all the surrounding Mughal territories including those of Balaghat. Sarbuland Rai had a mind to oppose him, but as he had not sufficient forces with him he was advised not to risk an engagement. Without meeting with any resistance, the Nizam Shahi general proceeded to Burhanpur and laid siege to it.

13. *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition pp. 392—393; *Iqbalnama* pp. 287—288; *Khafi Khan Vol. I*, p. 350.

During this time Shah Jahan, driven from Northern India, stepped into the Deccan, and, again, did he make an attempt to win Malik Ambar over to his side. This time he got a favourable response. As Malik Ambar was at enmity with the Mughals, he had no sympathy for them, but, if, on the other hand, he could gain Shah Jahan's support, however small it might be, it would be a cause of additional strength to him. He had already occupied southern Berar, the environs of Ahmadnagar, a considerable portion of eastern Bijapur, and humbled Adil Shah. Two Mughal forts—Burhanpur and Ahmadnagar—were holding out, and if he could expel them from those places, the road of Mughal aggrandizement in the south would be totally blocked, thus giving him unrivalled supremacy in the Deccan. He had been straining every nerve to take possession of them, and at such an hour Shah Jahan's offer of friendship was a boon to him.

It was now arranged that the Prince would proceed to Burhanpur with a reinforcement

to help Yaqut Khan and press the siege. The Prince, accordingly, moved towards Burhanpur, encamped at Lalbagh in the suburb of Burhanpur, and in co-operation with Yaqut Khan, set himself to reduce the fort. A simultaneous attack was made upon it from two different directions by his lieutenants Abdulla Khan and Shah Quli. The former could not achieve anything, but the latter made a breach in the wall of the fort, entered it, and fought hard to occupy it. But Sarbuland Rai gave him a strong opposition and eventually compelled him to retreat. Shah Jahan ordered a second attempt to storm it, but there, too, he met with no better success. A third attempt was made under his personal supervision, and it ended in a severe fight between him and the Royalists, but with no tangible effect.

The siege was thus protracted when the arrival of Prince Parvez and Mahabat Khan from the north saved the besieged Mughals. On their approach both Shah Jahan and Yaqut Khan gave

up the siege and retreated to the south¹⁴. Despairing of success, Shah Jahan opened negotiations with his father for pardon and, at last, an understanding was arrived at between the father and the son on condition of the latter surrendering the forts of Rohtas and Asirgarh, and sending his sons Dara Shukoh and Aurangzeb as hostages to the Royal Court (1626 A. D.).

Section II. Recall of Mahabat Khan and the death of Malik Ambar in May, 1626 A. D.

The Mughal general Mahabat Khan, who had rendered valuable services in the pursuit of Shah Jahan and who had attained to an exalted and influential position in the Mughal Empire, now became an eyesore to Nur Jahan Begam. He was recalled from the Deccan and was charged with the embezzlement of public money. Perceiving that evil days were waiting upon him, the Mughal general took up arms against the

14. *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition pp. 394—395; *Iqbalnama* pp. 243—244 ; *Khafi Khan* Vol. I, pp. 356—357.

Emperor and his consort, upon which Khan-i-Jahan Lodi was ordered to take up the command in the Deccan.

The attention of the Mughal Government was now concentrated on the reduction of Mahabat Khan, and no able general or politician, who might be expected to withstand successfully the attacks of Malik Ambar, was left in the Deccan. This was a fine opportunity for him to give a stunning blow to the Mughals by driving them beyond the Narbada and thus completely shutting their road of aggrandizement in the Deccan. But it was ordained otherwise, and his death in May, 1626 A.D., at the age of eighty, put a stop to his brilliant activities.

The great hero lies buried at Amrapur, a village thirty two miles north-east of Ahmadnagar fort, on the modern road from Ahmadnagar,

MALIK AMBAR

via Shevgaon to Paithan on the Godavari.

APPENDIX¹⁷ TO CHAPTER VII.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar visited the tomb of Malik Ambar in January 1933 and also inspected the Persian *sanads* in the possession of his descendants. The tomb is a plain uncovered and unenclosed low structure of brick (or stone) covered with stucco and lime, forming a platform about 12 feet by 8, and eighteen inches in height. There is a small mosque on its west side, very simple and commonplace in style. Neither bears any inscription, though Persian verses are written with ink on the polished stucco surfaces of the pillars of the mosque (probably a later addition) and the names of the Prophet and the first four Khalifs are written in a large crude hand on the inside of the western wall of the mosque.

The descendants of Malik Ambar have lost every physical trace of their Abyssinian origin, and now look exactly like the Maratha peasantry

17. Information supplied by Sir J. N. Sarkar.


of the poorer class, being only slightly higher in stature than their Hindu neighbours.

Their *sanads* prove that lands yielding ten thousand Rupees were assigned for the upkeep of the tomb of Malik Ambar, but there were frequent complaints that the *mutawwali* for the time being was wasting the estate, or had misappropriated the income without giving his coparceners their due share, and sometimes that the *mutawwali-ship* was seized by an unauthorised junior member of the family who had set the lawful heir aside. The *sanads* of Aurangzeb and, later, of the Nizams, were issued for doing justice in these cases and giving the lawful claimants their dues.

The village is called in the *sanads* 'Ambarpur' from Malik 'Ambar, but all people now pronounce the word as *Amrapur*.

GENEALOGY OF MALIK AMBAR.

Malik Ambar.



18. Abd. Ham's Pad. IA. 296, eldest son, p. 410.

19. Son of Ambar, *ibid*, p. 268.

20. Son of Ambar, *ibid*, p. 383.

Land given by Shah Jahan for maintaining the tomb of Malik Ambar's widow, Sitti Karimā, village Sātū Khedè near Sakhar Khedlè, yielding Rs. 350 per annum by Sanad of Shah Jahan and Nizam-ul-Mulk and continued by Peshwa. [Vad, Balaji Vol. II, p. 120].

CHAPTER VIII.

Section 1. Character and achievements of Malik Ambar.

“Ambar” is an Arabic word meaning a rich perfume, known in Europe as “ambergris”. Writing sixty years after his death, Bhimsen, the author of “Nuskha-i-Dilkasha,” says that although Malik Ambar was dead, his sweet fragrance remained behind,¹ and Grant Duff, the well-known author of “A History of the Marhattas,” practically echoing the same view said that Malik Ambar’s memory was still preserved with particular veneration in the legends of his country.²

In spite of all the adverse circumstances and vicissitudes of fortune, Malik Ambar, by dint of his skill, undaunted courage, and rare genius carved out for himself a path to greatness

1. Dilkasha Sir J. N. Sarkar’s Ms. p. 10.

2. A History of the Marhattas Vol. I, p. 96.

unprecedented in the annals of the Indian Abyssinians. Unlike the slave kings of Delhi, such as Qutbuddin, Altamsh, and Balban, who had the good fortune of rising through royal patronage, he had to wander about to find out his own livelihood, and, although, fortune favoured him with the patronage of a generous and noble-minded person like Chengiz Khan³ for sometime, it snatched him away too soon, plunging him again into the abysmal depth of sorrow and helplessness. But through redoubtable strength of mind, and adventurous spirit, he steered successfully through all the storms of adverse fortune till he attained the highest position in the Nizam Shahi kingdom.

He was a man of indefatigable energy, uncommon strength, and extraordinary intelligence, the like of which is rarely to be met with in the annals

3. Malik Ambar venerated the memory of his master by engraving on his seal, the words "Malik Ambar, the servant of Chengiz Khan" (*Tarikh-i-Shivaji*, folio 7a, translated by Sir J. N. Sarkar, *Modern Review* Vol. I, January to June 1907 pp. 241—242.).

of any country. In mediæval India he was one of the most imposing personalities of his time, not only in the Deccan but also in the whole of India. His undaunted heroism, commanding talents, unfailing resourcefulness, and inflexible determination to preserve the dignity of the State enabled him to solve successfully all the problems of his time. As a sensible man, he was under no illusion as to his own perilous situation, but he was confident that he would surmount it and survive. The magnitude of the perils, without making him nervous, confirmed his fortitude, which carried him safely even through the most dangerous and desperate situations. His perseverance was proverbial, and instead of being dispirited by reverses, he restored the fallen territories, bit by bit, and recovered the honour of the dying State. He strengthened the hill-forts, extorted the homage of the recalcitrant chiefs, and by a skilful combination of the Deccani powers stemmed the torrent of Mughal inroad in the south for about a quarter of a century. He remodelled the civil and military

administrations of the kingdom, made its roads safe from robbers,⁴ gave it a new system of land revenue, which made his people happy and prosperous, and finally, left a kingdom full of freshness and vitality. His brilliant achievements were enshrined in the hearts of his countrymen.

Section 2. Malik Ambar as a general.

As a military commander he was incomparable in his age. He re-organized the militia, taught it a new method of warfare, known as the predatory warfare, best suited to the physical condition of the country and the genius of the local races, and imprinted in the hearts of his countrymen a new martial spirit, which rejuvenated the fallen country. He also proved that he was not merely a master of predatory warfare, but was equally efficient in pitched battles even against heavy odds. The battle of Bhatvadi, in particular, was a great test of his military genius,

4. Dilkasha Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. p. 11 ; Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. 111, p. 9.

and there he proved his real mettle by routing the combined forces of the Mughals and the Adil Shahis, so as to turn the tables completely upon them.

He knew when to strike and when to wait. When in 1624 A. D., the Mughal and Bijapuri forces chased him from Bijapur, he retreated and negotiated for peace, but when his efforts proved futile, he made the best choice of the ground, waited for a suitable moment for a general action, made the best use of his tactics, and gave a crushing defeat to his opponents in the famous battle of Bhatvadi.

His tactics and ingenuity were beyond the power of his adversaries to cope with, and he led his army in triumphant march from one field to another. The Mughal Government, which was then at the height of its glory and which had no paucity of great generals and statesmen, showed its bankruptcy in dealing with him. It was not only that they lost their hold on the Nizam Shahi kingdom and were repeatedly worsted in

engagements, but they were besieged in the very heart of their capital city in the Deccan more than once. Shah Jahan achieved temporary successes over him, but his victories had very little permanent effect upon the country in as much as his exit from the scene made Malik Ambar the master of the situation again. These great military achievements of the Abyssinian chief undoubtedly proved his high efficiency as a general, which has been testified to by all the eminent historians including even his critic Mutamad Khan, the author of *Iqbalnama*.⁵

Section 3. Malik Ambar as a politician.

As a politician he stood far above his contemporaries. It was through his sound judgment and extraordinary skill in politics that the dying Nizam Shahi kingdom was saved from extinction.

Through his keen foresight and mastery of statecraft he diagnosed the disease of the body-politic

5. *Iqbalnamap*.271; *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition p. 409 ; *Dilkasha* p. 11 ; *Maasir-ul-Umara* Vol. III, p. 9.

and healed it in all its limbs. As an expert politician his actions were always characterized by caution and due deliberation. The oft quoted maxim "Look before you leap," was his guiding motto, and he was ever wakeful to avail himself of any favourable moment which might hold out the slightest ray of hope in it. He gave the first serious blow to the Mughals when they were deeply engrossed in their affairs in the north, and within a short time he gained complete sway over his country. Again, when Shah Jahan's rebellion drew away the attention of the Mughal Government, Malik Ambar did not lose sight of this opportunity to gain his ends, and before his death, he was again triumphant in the Deccan. He was thus an opportunist and would like to wait rather than court disgrace by any hasty action. When the exigencies of the moment required it, he would cleverly manage to ward off defeat by ingenious means. Twice did he yield to the demands of the Mughals when he found Shah Jahan's activities too hot for him. He bent but did not break, and again he pushed

them away in a convenient hour.) None of their tactics, ingenuity, and diplomacy could bring him down to his knees and up to his death in 1626 A. D., he maintained the uncompromising independence of the Nizam Shahi kingdom with credit.

Fully aware of the great strength of the Mughal Government, he, like an astute politician, broke his own isolation by forming alliances, both defensive and offensive, with the neighbouring kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda⁶ and thereby tried to counteract the Mughal aggressions in the Deccan. The Deccani powers were keenly alive to the fate of the kingdom of Khandesh⁷ and the pitiable condition of Bahadur Nizam Shah, who was suffering imprisonment at Gwalior, and no one would like to be such a victim. It was only natural for them to expect that if the

6. We have seen that Bidar also joined the confederacy for sometime.

7. The independent kingdom of Khandesh, north of Ahmadnagar, was finally conquered and annexed to the Mughal Empire by Akbar in January, 1601 A.D.

Mughals were allowed to continue their policy of annexation in the south, one State after another, would fall into their iron grip, and so, mainly out of a sense of their own insecurity and partly out of their sympathy for their neighbour, both Bijapur and Golconda took up the cause of Nizam Shah. It was Malik Ambar's adroitness that knit them together in such a close bond of union for about two decades, forming a strong bulwark of opposition to the Mughals south of the Narbada ; and it was only during the latter end of his career that there was an open rupture between him and Adil Shah which threw the latter into their common enemy's arms.

The union of these powers gave Malik Ambar his desired strength and so long as he was alive he kept in check the selfish greed of the Mughals. No greater importance could be attached to his other achievements as a politician than this judicious formation of a coalition with the neighbouring States in as much as it not only saved his dilapidated kingdom from annihilation but also

enabled him to repair the fallen fabric, restore its vitality, and revive its splendour.

Section 4. Malik Ambar as a statesman.

The true worth of a ruler is to be judged not from his high sounding conquests, or glorious military campaigns, but from the manner in which he strives to maintain and preserve those conquered territories. Conquests have no meaning unless the different fragments are properly consolidated, the discordant notes are harmonized, and a proper machinery of government is devised for their good administration. Conquerors, there have been many, but few have known how to preserve their acquisitions. The glories of Akbar lay not so much in his great military campaigns as in his efficient administration of the conquered places. As a matter of fact, if his high military attainments had not been followed by proper consolidation, the whole Empire would have tumbled down and his achievements would have come to naught.

just as the Empires of Chengiz Khan and Mahmud of Ghazni, which had been loose parts of a body-politic and had no proper machinery of Government, fell down as soon as those towering personalities made their exit from the political arena.

With these instances before him, Malik Ambar could well-perceive what would follow his death if the different fragments of his kingdom were not duly consolidated, if all the heterogeneous elements were not united for a common cause, and if a proper system of Government was not devised for the administration of his country. So, in spite of his stormy life, he did all that was necessary to preserve the kingdom from disruption. The new acquisitions were brought under close control and one uniform system of government was devised for their administration. All party factions, lawlessness, turbulence, and other disintegrating forces were put down with an iron hand. At the same time, his excellent land revenue system, based on the love and

good-will of his subjects, gave satisfaction to all classes alike.)

He knew that unless a Government stood on the sympathy and good wishes of the people, it could not last long. Acting up to this maxim he made every endeavour to satisfy his subjects and his treatment of them was characterized by love, affection, justice, and impartiality. This sympathetic consideration of the ruler engendered in the minds of the ruled a corresponding sympathy and reverence for their master and earned for him the much coveted popularity, very scarce in those days.

There was another feature in his far-sighted administration and this was his treatment of his Hindu subjects. Throughout his benign regime there was a policy of religious toleration

religion without any interference or hindrance from the Government. Moreover, religion was no bar to Government appointments. Merit alone was the passport to all services, and everyone, irrespective of his caste, creed and rank, was taken into those appointments. As a matter of fact, even many posts of high distinction were filled up by the Hindus. Shahji, Sharifji, Vithalraj, and Jadav Rao—all occupied high stations in the kingdom and rendered valuable services to it, both in civil and military administrations. All of them worked side by side, with their Muhammadan brethren in concord and amity, and the whole country thus breathed a hallowed atmosphere of love, cordiality and toleration.

Section 5. Malik Ambar's treatment of Murtaza Nizam Shah II.

His devotion to the king Murtaza Nizam Shah II was sincere and he served him loyally till the last breath of his life. It is true that there were occasional misunderstandings between them,

but they were mainly due to the machinations of Malik Ambar's antagonists, and when these men were removed, there was smooth sailing for both of them.⁸ These wranglings had, moreover, no lasting effect and a sense of good-will and fellow-feeling sweetened their future relations and life-long activities. No contemporary or later historian has stigmatized him with the guilty aspiration of usurping the throne by the deposition of its legal sovereign. From the writings of Ferishta and other historians it is obvious that he once cherished the idea of removing him from the throne and setting up another in his stead. But its reason, as assigned by Ferishta,⁹ was the king's intrigue with his enemies. The welfare of the kingdom was uppermost in his mind, and if the king had been allowed to continue his intrigues in this way, it would have meant a harmful split and commotion in the country.

8. After the removal of Malik Ambar's enemies like Farhad Khan, Patang Rao, Malik Sandal, and Raju only one solitary instance of wrangling occurred between the king and Malik Ambar, but it was soon made up.

9. Tarikh-i-Ferishta Vol. II, p. 166.

It was of imperative necessity to avert the repetition of such a calamity, and it was this motive which prompted him to make an attempt to be relieved of such a sovereign. He had never thought of occupying the throne himself and no historian has ever hinted at it. If he had any intention of removing the king for his own enthronement, precedents would not have been found wanting. The annals of mediæval India could have furnished him with ample materials.¹⁰ But he was made of a nobler stuff and no such action polluted the hands of this great personality.

Section 6. His treatment of his enemies.

His treatment of his enemies was determined by the demands of the State, tempered by justice

10. Jallaluddin Khilji, who was a high official under the slave kings of Delhi, usurped that throne from the last slave king in 1290 A. D. ; Ghiyasuddin Tughlak, who had been governor of Dibalpur in the Punjab, usurped the same throne in 1321 A.D. ; and Bahlol Lodi, governor of the Punjab, usurped it from the Syed dynasty in 1450 A. D.

and humanity. If it was possible to win them over by means of conciliation and toleration, he would do so ; but if it was not possible, or if it proved unavailing, he was ready to take any drastic step necessary to suppress turbulence and lawlessness. His constitution possessed in an equal proportion the finer instincts of humanity as well as a stubborn and inflexible determination to root out evils with an iron hand. At times, he was soft and mild, as was illustrated by his treatment towards Ali Mardan Khan,¹¹ the Mughal lieutenant, and, at others, he was equally hard, as could be exemplified by his policy towards Adam Khan and Farhad Khan.¹²

Section 7. Malik Ambar's administration of justice.

Malik Ambar was a great lover of justice and equity. The happy saying of Akbar, the great Mughal, who said, "If I were guilty of an unjust

11. Iqbalnama p. 66.

12. Iqbalnama p. 237.

act, I would rise in judgment against myself,"¹³ was fully applicable to this Abyssinian nobleman. He made every effort to dispense justice in a befitting manner, which is attested by all the eminent authorities, Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Iqbalnama, Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, Dilkasha, and Maasir-ul-Umara.¹⁴ All classes of people from the soldiers to the rayats were contented under his regime and his fame was not confined within the four walls of the Ahmad-nagar kingdom, but it spread far and wide, which is testified to by a fine story narrated by Khafi Khan.

After the battle of Bhatvadi when the captured Mughal and Bijapuri amirs were brought before him, he scolded them saying that it was

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13. Happy sayings—Jarrett's Ain-i-Akbari Vol. III, p. 387.
 14. Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. p. 578; Iqbalnama p. 271; Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition p. 409; Muntakhab-ul-Lubab of Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 349—350; Dilkasha p. 11; Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. III, pp. 9—10.

not proper for them to take to their heels from the battle-field. With this he ordered each of them to be punished with one hundred lashes. Among the captives was a poet and mansabdar of five-hundred. When he was brought for punishment, he said, "I heard Malik Ambar was a just and upright man, but it was a mistake for me to think so. How can it be called justice to punish all—a mansabdar of 3,000 and 2,000 in the same manner?" Malik Ambar was so glad to hear these words that he exempted him from the punishment.¹⁵ Whatever truth there might be in the above story, it leaves on us a clear impression about Malik Ambar's wide-spread renown as a dispenser of even-handed justice. It was a by-word even in the Mughal and Bijapuri camps.¹⁶

15. Khafi Khan Vol. I, pp. 349—350.

16. It is said that Malik Ambar was also fastidious in charity and beneficence, and about his piety he is compared to the pious Belal, the Prophet Muhammad's disciple. (Maasir-ul-Umara Vol. III, pp. 9—10, Dilkasha Sir J. N. Sarkar's Ms. p. 10).

Section 8. Marhatta nation and Malik Ambar's legacy to them.

The Marhattas are a race of sturdy, brave, active, self-reliant, and laborious men. They did not play any conspicuous part in the Mediæval history of the Deccan after the fall of the Jadavas, and even as late as the beginning of the seventeenth century they were merely paid servants of Bijapur, Ahmadnagar, and partly of Golconda. Their active habits and extraordinary rapidity of movement had attracted the attention of the two first named Governments, within which was situated almost the whole of Maharashtra, and they had enlisted them in good numbers from time to time according to necessity till the Marhattas became an important factor in the armies of both these kingdoms.

When Malik Ambar made his appearance in the Nizam Shahi kingdom, he found them an important factor there and the light Marhatta cavalry, who formed the most valuable auxiliary in the Deccan army, drew his special attention.

He enlisted them in large numbers, gave them proper military training, and pitted them against the Mughals. "They knew every path and rock in their native wilds and could pit their knowledge of woodcraft against the military training of their Muslim enemies."¹⁷ Their skilful manœuvre, rapidity of movement, and aptitude for climbing hills were too much for the northerners, who were wholly unaccustomed to these new tactics.

Malik Ambar's political training and organization of the Marhattas were primarily meant for the protection and welfare of the Nizam Shahi kingdom, but in a way unexpected by him they produced more far-reaching results. Their national hardihood, perseverance, and aptitude for guerilla warfare when combined with the superior military training and marvellous command of Malik Ambar, made them invincible. As such, Malik Ambar stands first as the builder

17. V. A. Smith—*Oxford History of India* pp. 425—426.

of the Marhatta nation, since it was his initiation, training, and organization which nourished them into a powerful nation. Following his footsteps Shivaji carried his military tactics to the height of perfection and knit the whole Marhatta nation into a united brotherhood by the establishment of a strong and powerful national kingdom in the south.

CHAPTER IX.

Section 1. Malik Ambar and Mahmud Gawan compared as administrators.

Malik Ambar was as famous for his efficient administration as for his conquests. In the former sphere of activity he may be best compared with another great administrator of the Deccan, namely, Mahmud Gawan, the most devoted and loyal minister of the Bahmani sovereign Muhammad Shah III. Both Malik Ambar and Mahmud Gawan served their respective countries with sincere devotion and fidelity, and it must be said to the credit of both that through their successful pilotage their countries enjoyed peace, prosperity, and happiness. But compared with Mahmud Gawan, Malik Ambar stands forth as a greater personality. It was true that both of them introduced salutary administrative reforms into their respective countries, which checked the centrifugal forces and gave them the requisite cohesion and homogeneity, but the respective

situations under which these noblemen had to labour marked them out distinctly from each other. Mahmud Gawan found the kingdom in an established and settled condition to which his genius added new lustre. But Malik Ambar found the kingdom in a ruined state—the legal sovereign a State prisoner, the capital city in the possession of the enemy, and the whole governmental organization shattered. It required no mean genius to set the fallen fabric right and impart to it a new governmental organization. His importance was no less than that of the creator of a new kingdom ; and more so, because of the fact that he had to carry out everything in the face of the stern opposition of a powerful adversary like the Mughals then at the height of their power. His famous revenue reforms and his radical changes in the military organization have, moreover, placed his name much above that of the Bahmani minister Mahmud Gawan as an administrator, both in civil and military affairs. But as a man Mahmud Gawan's extreme simplicity of style, his generous munificence, and his vast

erudition, both in arts and science, and his devotion to the king, which ended with the sacrifice of his own life,¹ are almost unparalleled in mediæval Indian history.

Section 2. Positions of the King, the Prime Minister, and the Regent.

A study of the contemporary authorities reveals to us that the administrative arrangements of the Ahmadnagar kingdom were on military lines and every official had to render military service to the State.

1. In the Bahmani Empire there were two powerful parties—one formed by the foreigners, that is, who were inhabitants of foreign countries like Persia, Arabia, etc., but who subsequently settled in the Bahmani Empire; and, the other, formed by the Deccanis in conjunction with the Abyssinians. Mahmud Gawan, being an inhabitant of Persia, was a foreigner and the leader of that party. He was disliked by the Deccani party, who made a conspiracy to take away his life. They produced a false and forged treasonable letter in his name to the king Muhammad Shah III in his drunken state who, without ascertaining the truth, ordered his execution. It was too late when the King discovered the real truth.

At the head of the governmental machinery was the king himself, an absolute monarch with unlimited powers, similar in position to the Khalifs of Iraq or Egypt. Like the latter, he was the high priest, the supreme judge, and the executive ruler of the country, thus combining both the powers, spiritual and temporal, of the Pope and the Cæsar. Although in strict theory he was liable to explain his conduct to the learned Muslim theologians, in practice he was all powerful and responsible to nobody ; no constitutional body like the parliament of our present day was devised as a check upon the absolute and irresponsible autocrat. The most important office below the king's was that of the Peshwa or the Prime Minister. He was appointed by the king and his promotion and dismissal as well depended on him alone. Unlike the ministers of our present day under the parliamentary system of government the Ahmadnagar minister was neither the elected agent of the people, nor was he liable to explain his conduct before any representative body. He was accountable to the king alone

for his actions, and so long as he enjoyed the confidence of the king he had no apprehension of losing his situation. His position was analogous to that of the Vizier or Prime Minister of the Khalifs, and like the latter so long as the king took a lively interest in the affairs of the government this minister was no better than his secretary bound to follow his dictation and register his will. But it was only when the king was weak or inefficient that the Peshwa practically stepped into his place and became the real source of power and patronage.) From the writings of contemporary authorities references to other departmental ministers can be gleaned, but they had very little independence of position and were no better than secretaries.

Sometimes provision had also to be made for the smooth administration of the kingdom during the minority of a crowned head, and on such occasions the nobleman, who was best acquainted with the affairs of the State and who wielded the greatest authority, generally became

the Regent. It sometimes happened that the posts of the Peshwa (or the Prime Minister) and the Regent were occupied by one and the same person, and, at others, by different persons. As an instance of the latter, the Regency of Chand Bibi may be mentioned; at one period of her Regency a nobleman named Muhammad Khan was the Peshwa and, at another time, Ahang Khan occupied the post. But during Malik Ambar's Regency these two appointments were amalgamated and held by Malik Ambar himself.² He was all-powerful in the State and the main-spring of the whole machinery.

Owing to the decadence of the character of the monarchy, his position was somewhat different from that of the previous ministers of the Ahmadnagar kingdom; his appointment did not come from the king, but he was, so to speak, a self-made minister. Besides, the valuable and gallant services he rendered to the Nizam Shahi

2. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri R. and B. Vol. I, p. 220; Syed Ahmad's Persian Text p. 107; Khafi Khan Vol. III, p. 264.

kingdom, gave him an advantage not enjoyed by any previous wazir. The king was merely an ornamental head, and even when he passed from his minority Malik Ambar used to guide and control all affairs as before. With the advance of age Murtaza Nizam Shah II perceived the true worth of this Abyssinian chief and he allowed him to carry on the administration as usual without interference.

Section 4. Provincial administration.

So far as can be gleaned from the leading authorities, the Ahmadnagar kingdom was divided into provinces called Tarfs and districts called Sarkars. Over each of these provinces and districts there were governors and district officers respectively, who were responsible for the proper administration of the area within their jurisdictions. The Sarkars were again divided into smaller units like Parganas, which were known by different names, such as Mahal, Taluk, or Desh. During Malik Ambar's regime the administration

was highly efficient, due to his close vigilance and keen supervision, and any oppression or high-handedness of his officials was promptly checked. There was no doubt of his administrative ability and, not to speak of other writers even the Mughal histories *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* and *Iqbalnama* admit it.³ He kept down the refractory spirit of the people and put a stop to highway robbery which was then very common in his country. All people alike had to bow down to his authority and the roads, which were once dangerous and unsafe, were rendered by him safe and free from apprehension.

Section 5. Army and garrison of the hill-forts.

As Malik Ambar's life was one of great struggle he had to maintain a well-trained and well-equipped standing army throughout his career, and keep it at a high pitch of efficiency by

3. *Tatimma-i-Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* as printed in Syed Ahmad's Edition p. 409 ; *Iqbalnama* pp. 271—272.

constant exercise. His army consisted mainly of cavalry, though infantry and elephants were used when confronting an enemy in the open field. But his most effective weapon of offence, as we have seen in actual campaigns, was his light cavalry, which sapped the military efficiency of the Mughals, just as Shivaji did a little later, similar to the fate of Napoleon Bonaparte's grand army in Spain. The success of Malik Ambar's arms proved the efficiency of his military department.

One of the greatest assets of the Ahmadnagar kingdom was the existence of several important and strategic hill-forts within its jurisdiction, and sufficient care and attention had to be directed upon them to keep them under control and well-garrisoned. Malik Ambar fully realized their value and utilized them in all circumstances. All the forts like Ausa, Parenda, Junnar, Daulatabad, and Ahmadnagar were placed under officers recruited and paid direct by the central government, and were subject

to the strict vigilance of Malik Ambar. The smaller forts might have been left to be garrisoned by the respective district officers within whose jurisdiction they were situated, but his strict supervision must have exercised all necessary checks upon those officials to keep them alive to their sense of duty.

✧ Section 6. Malik Ambar's land revenue system.

Great as was his achievement as a general, his name is much more closely intertwined with his famous land revenue system. In spite of his frequent preoccupation in military campaigns, he found leisure to devise means for enhancing the welfare of his subjects and serving the best interests of the country. That he took paternal care for the good of the peasantry and did what was conducive to their well-being can be clearly gleaned from the contemporary writings of Tazkirat-ul-Muluk.⁴

4. Tazkirat-ul-Muluk, Sir J.N. Sarkar's Ms. pp. 574, 578.

The system which he introduced was a new one, but based primarily on the system introduced into Northern India and in some portions of Gujarat and Khandesh by the great Mughal financier Raja Todar Mal. Like the latter his system was based on an accurate knowledge of the area under cultivation and the value of the crop; and, besides, he followed his principles of classification of lands and their assessment with reference to the fertility of the soil.

the deshmukhs and the deshpandes, who had, in the course of time, assumed the position of land farmers. (The oppression and high-handedness of these big land-holders to the poor cultivators, which led to the negligence of cultivation of rural areas, was apparent to him and he, therefore, sought to establish the direct relationship of the Government with the villages.⁵ (The collection of revenue was now entrusted to the village headmen or *patils*, who were made responsible for the punctual realization of the village revenue. Each such headman was bound to pay the revenue of the whole village within his jurisdiction in the same way as each land-holder was bound to pay the full share of his rent.⁶

His next step was to determine the produce of the land, and with this end in view he made

5. Ahmadnagar Gazetteer pp. 395, 423 ; Thana Statistical Account—Bombay Gazetteer XIII, part II, pp. 553—554 ; Major Jervis' Konkan p. 66 ; Grant Duff's—A History of the Marhattas Vol. I, p. 95.

6. Bombay Gazetteer—Poona Volume part II, p. 320 ; East India papers IV pp. 418—419.

arrangements for measurement and classification of lands. With regard to the character of Malik Ambar's survey it is stated that "the areas were fixed not by measuring but by a glance estimate or Nazar Pahani." Lands were divided into good and bad, according to fertility, and no elaborate and detailed classification like that of Todar Mal was intended in his scheme. Although he called the divisions of land or holdings "bigha," he used this word in its "original sense of share and not in its later sense of an area, containing a definite number of square yards. He seems to have fixed the amount which a holding could bear by a test of the produce it yielded. In some cases a man might hold double as large a bigha as another, but the land was probably one half rich and so the pressure of the demand was the same. It was the crop-yielding powers of the different estates which were fixed not their areas."

He had taken great pains to ascertain the

average yield of the village lands, and in his experiments, which took a number of years, arable lands were only taken into account. Rice lands were divided into four classes, first, second, third, and fourth (Aval, Dum, Sim, and Char-sim). The "uplands were classified in a more general way."⁸

After the ascertainment of arable lands in the villages, they were divided according to the old custom into two classes, jirayat or corn-land and bagayat or garden land. Another division was necessary for the sake of Government revenue and this was Khalsa, i.e., lands yielding revenues to the Government, and inamat, i.e., lands whose revenues had been alienated either through royal favour (to mosques, temples etc.) or in return for service. After deducting the latter from the total arable area, the Khalsa lands were shown as containing so much corn-lands (jirayat) and so much garden-

8. Bombay Gazetteer—Thana Statistical Account part II, p. 554.

lands (bagayat). In the accounts first came the rent-alienated lands, then the details of the Khalsa lands, and lastly, the various cesses on the craftsmen, and shopkeepers etc.⁹

At first Malik Ambar fixed the Government revenue as two-fifths of the produce in kind, but subsequently, the grain payment was commuted into money payment representing about one-third of the yield.¹⁰ An average rent for normal years called the *tankha* was settled for every plot of land and for every village, but this rent was not fixed permanently and it showed what one would pay in a normal year. The actual collections were made in accordance with

9. Bombay Gazetteer—Poona Vol. part II, p. 318.

10. Ahmadnagar Gazetteer pp. 395, 423 ; Grant Duff's A History of the Marhattas Vol. I, pp. 95—96. "These conversion rates did not vary with the fluctuations in the price of grain and from their extreme lowness were probably at the time when they were introduced greatly below the actual prices." (Bombay Gazetteer—Poona Vol. part II, p. 317).

the condition of the crops,¹¹ and the main determining factor was the harvest. If the season was bright, the actual collections increased, but if it was otherwise, the collection was correspondingly less. The assessment was thus made on an elastic and sympathetic basis which gave satisfaction to the peasants. This principle of adaptability and his moderate demands gave a new impetus to agriculture, and besides, they enabled the headmen or patils to give out waste lands at rates which encouraged the cultivators to till them, thus converting many waste lands into useful cultivated fields.

“Instead of keeping the state sole land owner” Malik Ambar gave the people “a definite interest in the soil they tilled.” He made a considerable portion of the land private property. The lands of the village were considered the joint property of the township, the fallow land was the common for the pasture of the cattle, and the ploughed land was either the property of indivi-

11. Bombay Gazetteer—Ahmadnagar vol. pp. 423—424.

dual villagers or it was tilled by the headman's tenants who received a portion of the crop. It appears to have been a principle of his wise administration to encourage the possession of private landed property as a means of attaching the cultivators to the soil....."¹² This excellent measure served two useful purposes; first, it satisfied the people and thus strengthened the Government, and secondly, it led to the cultivation of lands which might have otherwise been neglected and thus deprived the Government of a share of revenue. Malik Ambar's system, therefore, "combined the two great merits of a moderate and permanent tax and the possession by the cultivators of an interest in the soil."¹³

The one point which may be open to criticism is that as the settlement was made with the village headman or patil (who was made hereditary) instead of individual cultivators, it left room for the former to use his power and influence to his own advantage at the cost of the

12. Bombay Gazetteer—Ahmadnagar vol. p. 424.

13. Khandesh Gazetteer p. 267.

latter. This matter did not escape the notice of a wise and far-sighted administrator like Malik Ambar, and against this danger he imposed necessary safeguards. The management and superintendence of revenue were entrusted to members of different nationalities, who might serve as a check upon one another. The management was entrusted to Brahmin agents but they had to work under the supervision of the Muhammadan officers,¹⁴ who might put a stop to the high-handedness, if any, of the Brahmin agents. This salutary check was of great benefit to the cultivators; and besides, Malik Ambar's close vigilance and personal supervision were powerful factors in overawing the greedy conduct of any official. On the whole, the people were happy and contented under his regime as has been recorded both by Mir Rafiuddin Shirazi and Fuzuni.¹⁵

14. Ahmadnagar Gazetteer p. 395. Grant Duff's *A History of the Marhattas* vol. 1, p. 95.

15. *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk* p. 578, *Fatuhāt-i-Adil Shahi* 270b.

His benign revenue administration made his name so popular that it became a household word almost in every family, and this popularity was a great asset of his Government. All the objects with which he inaugurated his system were thus fulfilled ; the peasantry were benefited, the country became prosperous and flourishing, agriculture was improved, many waste lands were converted into useful cultivated lands, and last of all, though not less important than the above, the Government revenue was greatly augmented, ¹⁶ and inspite of heavy military expenses, his Government was always financially solvent.

16. He is said to have doubled the Government revenue. (Bombay Gazetteer—Poona Vol. part II, p. 317).

APPENDIX.

Selections from the Peshwa Daftar.

Sanad No. 5 dated 13-8-1608 shows Malik Ambar's grant of an oil allowance to one Dattambhat, the son of Padmakarbhat.

No. 6 dated 1608—1609 shows Ambar's grant of an allowance of 5 hunns to Mego Nar-sinh Chitnawis.

In both these cases Ambar confirms the old grants and they are good specimens of his respect for the rights and privileges of his Hindu subjects.

No. 17 dated 25-12-1644. Here the Panchayat confirmed the practice of Malik Ambar in a dispute between Dawal and Rambhaji Naik about the Naikwadi of Parner.

No. 18 dated 1647. Here Shivaji confirmed "an inam granted by Malik Ambar. The village officials required a fresh confirmation owing to the death of Dadoji Kondadev."

Nos. 19 dated 1649, 23 dated 6-5-1655, 77 dated after 1707, and 103 dated 24-6-1708 prove how Ambar's sanads were respected by the Marhattas, even including Raja Shahu.

All the above eight sanads taken together, show, on the one hand, Malik Ambar's love and respect for his Hindu subjects, and on the other, the latter's reverence for his memory even long after his exit from the political arena.

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ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA

P. XII, line 6, for "1867" read "1687."

P. 3, fourth line, for "profitted" read "profited."

P. 48, first line, for "benefitting" read "benefiting"

P. 89, third line, for "unprecedented" read "unprecedented."

P. 123, line 5, for "1625" read "15 June, 1625."

Pp. 10, 12, 158, for "Ahang Khan" read "Abhang Khan."

